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A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics:
Undoing the Mischief of Camara
and Terry
Scott E. Sundby*
INTRODUCTION
In its fourth amendment jurisprudence, the United States
Supreme Court has struggled continually, and unsuccessfully,
to develop a coherent analytical framework. Indeed, the Court
has admitted its fourth amendment shortcomings, confessing
that "[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches and
seizures ... has not-to put it mildly-run smooth."1 Abun-
dant criticism from both outside and within the Court has ac-
complished little, however, other than to highlight the Court's
failures. 2 If anything, the situation has grown more dire, with
the Court retaining a semblance of coherent fourth amendment
analysis only by resorting to exceptions or an ill-defined balanc-
ing test.3 Such stopgap measures, in turn, have merely rendered
fourth amendment analysis more makeshift, lacking continuity
in design and purpose.
The current state of affairs suggests that a reexamination
of fourth amendment basics is in order. Many of the Court's
present fourth amendment ills are symptoms of its failure to
meet two basic challenges presented by the fourth amend-
ment's text. First, the reasonableness clause's general proscrip-
* Associate Professor, University of California-Hastings College of the
Law. Professors Leo Kanowitz and Wayne Woody provided helpful comments
on earlier drafts. The author is especially grateful to Professor David Jung,
whose efforts far exceeded the call of collegiality.
1. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971) ("iflt
would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces Fourth Amend-
ment law to complete order and harmony."); Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1468, 1468-69 (1985) (Court's fourth
amendment doctrine is contradictory); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth
Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 47, 49 (1974) (doctrine is unstable).
3. See generally Bradley, supra note 2, at 1471-72 (detailing Court's use
of exceptions in fourth amendment area).
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tion against "unreasonable searches and seizures" must be
reconciled with the warrant clause's mandate that "no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause."4 Second, the con-
cept of reasonableness must be defined to reflect the
amendment's underlying values and purposes. Until the Court
meets these challenges, a systematic and coherent fourth
amendment analysis cannot emerge, relegating fourth amend-
ment case law to ad hoc resolutions lacking consistency and
clear justification.
Although the challenge of reconciling the warrant and rea-
sonableness clauses appears elementary, the Court's inability to
meet the challenge is understandable considering that the task
goes to the very core of the amendment's meaning and purpose.
Reconciling the clauses requires balancing the citizenry's pri-
vacy interest against the government's power to intrude in pur-
suing important government objectives. If the Court assigns
the warrant clause the greater role in fourth amendment analy-
sis, the warrant and probable cause requirements will restrict
the government's right to intrude. On the other hand, if the
Court primarily relies on a general reasonableness standard,
the obstacles of obtaining a warrant and proving probable cause
are removed, and the scope of valid government intrusions
broadens.5 The two clauses thus strike different balances be-
tween the citizenry's privacy interests and the government's po-
lice power, and emphasizing one clause or the other will reflect
the different balances. In many ways, to decide how the two
clauses interrelate is to determine the fourth amendment's val-
ues and purposes.
Delineating the relationship between the warrant and rea-
sonableness clauses in turn raises the second challenge-devis-
ing a test to guide the reasonableness inquiry that reflects the
values underlying the fourth amendment. Determining that
the reasonableness clause governs certain government intru-
sions accomplishes little unless the Court adequately defines a
reasonable search or seizure. As the Court's current efforts il-
4. The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 393-94 (1974) (describing problems of general reasonable-
ness standard).
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lustrate, reasonableness is a slippery concept that, without defi-
nitional restraints, can allow the range of acceptable
government intrusions to expand and overwhelm the privacy
interests at stake.6 Consequently, the definition of a reasonable
search or seizure should be sufficiently stringent to preclude
the temptation to undervalue privacy rights in comparison to
important government objectives.
The two challenges of fourth amendment interpretation
are formidable standing alone, and the Court's decisions in
Camara v. Municipal Court7 and Terry v. Ohio" have com-
pounded the difficulty. Faced with novel fourth amendment
questions, the Court in Camara and Terry turned to a broad
reasonableness standard and an ill-defined balancing test for
the immediate solutions. The combined effect of the Camara
and Terry holdings, however, has proven to be something of a
Faustian pact. The decisions allowed the fourth amendment's
scope to extend to government activities like housing inspec-
tions, but in the process they significantly undermined the role
of probable cause and set the stage for the long-term expansion
of the reasonableness balancing test without proper justifica-
tion or limits. Until the Court uncovers and remedies the hid-
den effects of Camara and Terry on fourth amendment
analysis, its struggle to meet the two challenges will be based
on a flawed view of the fourth amendment.
Because the effects of the Camara and Terry decisions on
fourth amendment analysis have placed the Court in its present
predicament, reevaluation of the Court's fourth amendment ju-
risprudence should begin with those cases. Part I of this Arti-
cle traces the Court's fourth amendment analysis from the
warrant clause's dominance through the eventual enthrone-
ment by Camara and Terry of the reasonableness balancing
test. In Part II the Article analyzes the conceptual shortcom-
ings of Camara and Terry. The Article demonstrates that those
cases have failed to meet the challenges of fourth amendment
interpretation because the relationship between the warrant
and reasonableness clauses remains unclear, and the Court's at-
tempts to contain the reasonableness balancing test have failed.
In Parts III and IV, the Article proposes a composite model of
the fourth amendment to meet its interpretational challenges.
The model provides independent roles for the warrant and rea-
6. See generally id. at 393.
7. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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sonableness clauses based on an initiatory-responsive intrusion
dichotomy. That distinction enables traditional probable cause
to regain a prominent analytical role while still retaining suffi-
cient flexibility to accommodate initiatory intrusions through
the reasonableness clause. The model also replaces the Court's
vague reasonableness balancing test with a strict scrutiny stan-
dard that provides precise guidance for the reasonableness in-
quiry and appropriately reorients fourth amendment analysis
toward protecting privacy interests. The Article concludes that
the Court should adopt the composite model to provide a coher-
ent analytical framework, something conspicuously absent from
the Court's current fourth amendment jurisprudence.
I. THE RISE OF REASONABLENESS IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. WHEN THE WARRANT CLAUSE WAS KING
Prior to Camara, fourth amendment analysis had a rela-
tively high amount of predictability: the Court presumed that a
warrant based on probable cause was required before the police
could perform a search or arrest.9 The Court's strong prefer-
ence for the warrant requirement relegated the amendment's
reasonableness clause, which bans "unreasonable searches and
seizures," to a secondary role. The Court used the concept of
reasonableness primarily to justify making an exception to the
warrant requirement when exigent circumstances dictated ex-
cusing the police from procuring a warrant.10 Although reason-
9. The Supreme Court even implied that a warrantless search was al-
ways invalid under the fourth amendment. See Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 32 (1925). Although the Court has clearly retreated from that posi-
tion, it has almost unfailingly maintained its strong preference for the warrant
requirement. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1499 (1987) (recog-
nizing that warrant is normally required); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,
370 (1968) (warrantless search of office for union papers unreasonable even if
subpoena duces tecum issued); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)
(warrant requirement too frequently ignored); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948) (warrant requirement protects citizens from police discre-
tion). The Court's warrant preference, however, has been neither unanimous,
see generally C. WHrrEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROcEDuRE 136-40
(1986), nor always strictly implemented, see O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1506
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that plurality did not properly defer to
warrant preference). See generally Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking
Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257, 258-62 (1984) (discussing con-
ventional interpretations of the fourth amendment).
10. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) ("exigencies of
the situation" may make warrant unnecessary); Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51 (war-
rant may be excused if "exceptional circumstances"); McDonald v. United
[Vol. 72:383
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ableness sometimes necessitated making an exception for
obtaining a warrant, probable cause remained sacrosanct, im-
mune from modification even in the name of reasonableness. 11
The Court's downplaying of an independent role for the
reasonableness clause resulted largely from its wariness of the
potential open-endedness of a fourth amendment test based on
reasonableness. For example, in rejecting the argument that
all searches incident to arrest are "reasonable" and thus consti-
tutional, the Court explained that the argument relied on
purely subjective views regarding the appropriateness of certain
police conduct while ignoring relevant fourth amendment in-
terests.32 Under such an unrestrained analysis, "Fourth
Amendment protection . . . would approach the evaporation
point."'13 The reasonableness clause thus served only as a back-
States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948) (invalidating search because compelling rea-
son for absence of warrant lacking). Moreover, the Court has interpreted exi-
gent circumstances fairly narrowly, rejecting a generalized emergency
exception. See Thompson v. Lousiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1984) (per curiam)
(only narrow exceptions exist to warrant requirement); Mincey, 437 U.S. at
393 ("[A] warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation."' (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968))).
But cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (immediate warrantless re-
entry to investigate fire's origins valid under fourth amendment).
11. The Court specifically noted that if a warrantless search could be
based on less than probable cause, "a principal incentive ... for the procure-
ment of ... warrants would be destroyed." Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963) (footnotes omitted). But cf. infra note 39 (adapting
probable cause to administrative subpoenas).
12. Specifically, the Court stated:
It is argued in the present case that it is "reasonable" to search a
man's house when he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded
on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of
certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to
Fourth Amendment interests.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969).
13. Id. at 765. The warrant clause's dominance was also partly premised
on a combined historical and textual argument:
One cannot wrench "unreasonable searches" from the text and con-
text and historic content of the Fourth Amendment. It was the an-
swer of the colonial Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches
without warrants and searches with warrants unrestricted in scope.
Both were deemed "unreasonable." Words must be "read with the
gloss of the experience of those who framed them . . . When the
Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches" and then went
on to define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant
issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all the clarity
of the gloss of history that a search is "unreasonable" unless a war-
rant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute neces-
sity. Even a warrant cannot authorize it except when it is issued
"upon probable cause ... and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
1988]
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ground value in guiding the Court's interpretation and applica-
tion of the warrant clause.14
The Court's almost exclusive focus on the warrant clause
yielded predictability and strong protections, but it was not
without costs. Because requiring a warrant based on probable
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
14. The one major deviation from the exceptions approach-in which the
Court used reasonableness alone as the measure of fourth amendment consti-
tutionality-was in the area of searches incident to arrest. In Rabinowitz a
majority of the Court relied on a generalized reasonableness approach to hold
that no warrant was required for a search incident to arrest:
[T]he Constitution does not say that the right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons should not be violated without a search warrant
if it is practicable for the officers to procure one. The mandate of the
Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure against unrea-
sonable searches.... The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable
to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.
That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances-the
total atmosphere of the case.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65-66 (emphasis in original).
The Rabinowitz majority's analysis represents what might be termed the
rule of reasonableness approach to the fourth amendment. Unlike the excep-
tions approach, in which the Court uses reasonableness to decide whether an
exception should be made to the warrant clause, the rule of reasonableness ap-
proach views reasonableness as the controlling rule of law. Thus the require-
ment of a warrant based on probable cause serves only as a guidepost in
determining whether a search was constitutional, but it is not determinative of
the constitutionality of the search.
The victory for the rule of reasonableness in Rabinowitz was ephemeral;
the holding was overruled in Chimel, 395 U.S. 756-62. The Chimel majority
strongly reaffirmed an exceptions approach to the fourth amendment, ex-
pressly rejecting the rule of reasonableness approach:
"We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search
warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the
Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen
and the police.... We cannot be true to that constitutional require-
ment and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing
by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that
the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative."
Id. at 761 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948)).
The Court also arguably used a reasonableness rather than exigent cir-
cumstances analysis in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In uphold-
ing a warrantless automobile search, the Carroll Court stressed the need for
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. Id. at 155-56. But the
Carroll opinion also included broad language supporting warrantless searches
of vehicles based on the difference between homes and vehicles without men-
tioning exigent circumstances. Id. at 153. The Court later characterized Car-
roll as both an exigent and nonexigent circumstances decision. See Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970) (discussing Carroll and subsequent cases).
Justice Harlan, however, viewed Carroll as based solely on an exigency ration-
ale. See id. at 62 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (criticizing the major-
ity's reliance on Carroll).
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cause would have precluded suspicionless government inspec-
tions, the Court did not extend the amendment's coverage very
far beyond the context of criminal arrests and searches.' 5
When the fourth amendment governed, therefore, it provided
the full protections of the warrant clause-but the protections
generally did not apply to government intrusions other than
criminal investigations.
The Court's warrant clause emphasis and corresponding re-
luctance to expand fourth amendment protections beyond crim-
inal investigations largely explain its holding in Frank v.
Maryland.'6 In Frank the Court addressed the issue whether
the defendant's conviction for resisting a warrantless inspection
of his house violated the fourth amendment. 17 Upholding the
15. The Court's unwillingness to extend fourth amendment protections
arguably was a result of inaction rather than an affirmative decision to limit
its scope to criminal investigations. Although historical evidence suggests that
the fourth amendment's origins were not limited to criminal investigation con-
cerns, see Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 46, 70-71, the Court's consideration of government
activities short of a full-scale search and seizure was primarily limited to court
orders to produce papers. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States,.116 U.S. 616 (1886)
(refusal to enforce order for invoices in custom duties case). Even in the area
of subpoenas, the Court's extension of fourth amendment protections was less
than enthusiastic. See generally Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Rawling,
327 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1946) (holding fourth amendment protection against pro-
duction of corporate papers is minimal). The Court was thus relatively free
from precedential restraints in later concluding that the amendment's applica-
bility in noncriminal investigation "touched at most upon the periphery."
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959). See also Stahl & Kuhn, Inspec-
tions and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U. PrrT. L. REv. 256, 262-63 (1950)
(fourth amendment traditionally limited to "criminal or quasi-criminal pro-
ceedings"); Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1129 n.3 (1984) (discussing relation between civil and
criminal searches under fourth amendment).
16. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). In Frank a city health inspector looking for a
source of rats in the neighborhood found the defendant's house in an "extreme
state of decay" and asked the defendant's permission to inspect the basement.
Id. at 361. The defendant refused permission, and after a subsequent attempt
to gain entry, the inspector swore out a complaint for the defendant's arrest
based on a city code section providing:
'Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect
that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may de-
mand entry therein in the day time, and if the owner or occupier shall
refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he
shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty
Dollars."
Id. at 361 (quoting BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 12, § 120 (1958)).
17. The Frank majority actually used due process terminology and was
less than explicit as to how, or to what extent, it viewed the fourth amend-
ment as incorporated into its due process analysis. Justice Whittaker specially
concurred simply to state his understanding that the majority opinion "ad-
1988]
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conviction and fine, the Frank majority espoused the tradi-
tional view that if inspections like those at issue were subject to
full fourth amendment protections, the search would have to
satisfy the warrant requirement.18 Yet requiring a warrant
based on probable cause for housing inspections would defeat
the inspections' objective of maintaining community health.' 9
Resisting efforts to modify the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements, the majority adopted an all-or-nothing view that if
the Constitution required a search warrant, "the requirement
[could not] be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the rigorous
constitutional restrictions for its issue. '20
Consistent with the Court's warrant clause, orientation, the
Frank majority also argued that because Frank's asserted pri-
vacy interest did not concern a criminal investigation, his claim,
at most, touched "upon the periphery" of the important fourth
amendment interests protected against invasion by government
officials.21 Stressing that the housing inspection was not a
here[d] fully to th[e] principle" that "[t]he core of the Fourth Amendment
prohibiting unreasonable searches applies to the States through the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Frank, 359 U.S. at 373. Justice
Whittaker's understanding of the majority's view of the fourth amendment ap-
pears correct given the majority's heavy reliance on the history of the fourth
amendment and its case law and values. See also infra note 26 (discussing
Camara majority's understanding of Frank). Justice Frankfurter's vacillation
between fourth amendment and general due process analysis may in part re-
flect an ambiguity at the time over the fourth amendment's applicability to the
states. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE § 10.1, at 599 (2d ed. 1987).
18. Frank, 359 U.S. at 373; see supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text
(discussing traditional supremacy of warrant requirement).
19. Justice Frankfurter argued:
Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect
dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search
or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable importance
to the maintenance of community health; a power that would be
greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards neces-
sary for a search of evidence of criminal acts.
Frank, 359 U.S. at 372.
20. Id. at 373. Justice Frankfurter also argued that full fourth amend-
ment protections were not necessary because the power of inspection already
was "hedged about with safeguards designed to make the least possible de-
mand on the individual occupant, and to cause only the slightest restriction on
his claims of privacy." Id. at 367. For instance, the ordinance required that
the inspector have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists and that the inspec-
tion be made during the day. Id. at 366. The ordinance also did not give the
inspector the power to make forceable entries if the occupant refused en-
trance. See id. at 366-67. For the majority the effect of such a narrowly tai-
lored inspection power was to further diminish the force of the defendant's
asserted privacy interest. See id. at 367.
21. See id. at 367.
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search for criminal evidence, Justice Frankfurter argued that
the Constitution's prohibition against official invasion arose al-
most entirely from the individual's fundamental right to be se-
cure from evidentiary searches made in connection with
criminal prosecutions. 22 The majority pointed to the historical
acceptance of warrantless inspections, not as an enforcement
mechanism of the criminal law, but "as an adjunct to a regula-
tory scheme for the general welfare."23 Consequently, the ma-
jority concluded that any legitimate liberty interest Frank had
was overwhelmed by the government's need for inspection and
the desirability of not tampering with the fourth amendment's
rigorous protections.
B. CAMARA: REASONABLENESS GETS A FOOT IN THE DOOR
In Camara v. Municipal Court,24 the Court overruled its
holding in Frank that the fourth amendment's full protections
did not extend to housing inspections.2 5 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice White rejected the "rather remarkable premise" in
Frank that because housing inspections were not criminal in-
vestigations, they were merely on the periphery of the fourth
amendment.26 He argued that inspection programs in fact went
to the fourth amendment's central purpose of "safeguard[ing]
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions by government officials."27 Given that purpose, the ma-
jority concluded that it would be anomalous to suggest that an
individual enjoys full fourth amendment protection only when
22. See id. at 365.
23. Id. at 367. Justice Frankfurter argued that in modern times the regu-
latory need was of "far greater magnitude than the writers of these ancient
inspection laws ever dreamed." Id. at 371-72.
24. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
25. Frank suffered one close call prior to Camara. In Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam), a conviction similar to the one at issue
in Frank was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Id. at 264. The Camara
Court justified its reconsideration of Frank by observing that state and local
governments had increased their use of inspections and at the same time "nu-
merous decisions of this Court have more fully defined the Fourth Amend-
ment's effect on state and municipal action." Camara, 387 U.S. at 525.
26. Camara, 387 U.S. at 531. The Camara majority clearly understood
Frank as being founded upon fourth amendment principles, "carving out an
additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 529. Cf. supra note 17 (noting the
Frank majority's unclear determination of the relation between the fourth
amendment and due process).
27. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528.
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suspected of criminal conduct. 28
Unshackling the fourth amendment from Frank's restric-
tive reading of the amendment's purpose, however, was only
the first step. The majority still had to address Frank's per-
ceived dilemma that application of the fourth amendment to
administrative inspections would either dilute the amendment's
protections or preclude blanket inspections altogether.29 In de-
ciding how to apply the amendment, the Court did not adopt a
new mode of fourth amendment analysis. Rather, it chose to
assess the government inspection program within the tradi-
tional warrant and probable cause framework. Justifying its
choice, the Court explained that it had adhered consistently to
the governing principle that "[elxcept in certain carefully de-
fined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized
by a valid search warrant. '30
Having elected to continue its historical warrant clause em-
phasis, the necessity of modifying the clause's requirements to
permit the housing inspections was evident. Traditional prob-
able cause required facts sufficient to justify a reasonably cau-
tious person in believing that another had committed or was
committing a crime.31 Whether a search or arrest was reason-
able depended at a minimum upon a showing of individualized
suspicion amounting to probable cause. The fourth amendment
would have precluded the government's power to conduct area
housing inspections, a power all agreed was necessary, if prob-
able cause required a showing of specific violations for each in-
spection. Consequently, the Camara majority redefined
probable cause: rather than requiring individualized suspicion,
28. Id. at 530. The Camara majority conceded at most that:
[A] routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is
a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the
fruits and instrumentalities of crime. For this reason alone, Frank dif-
fered from the great bulk of Fourth Amendment cases which have
been considered by this Court. But we cannot agree that the Fourth
Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely
"peripheral."
Id.
29. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
30. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29.
31. Specifically, probable cause controlled the definition of reasonableness
by limiting valid government intrusions to cases in which facts existed "suffi-
cient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has
been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76
(1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). See gener-
ally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 9, at 146-53.
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probable cause was recast as standing for a broader concept of
reasonableness based on a weighing of the governmental and
individual interests.32 Under the new definition, probable cause
existed and the warrant clause was satisfied once the Court
concluded that the area housing inspections, although lacking
individualized suspicion, were "reasonable. '33 Probable cause,
therefore, still served the formal function of a prerequisite for
the issuance of a warrant, but its traditional requirement of
particularized suspicion became merely one example of prob-
able cause's meaning in a particular setting.3
Ironically, in redefining probable cause as a flexible con-
cept,35 the Court's effort to satisfy the warrant clause gave rea-
sonableness a foot in the door as an independent factor in
fourth amendment analysis.36 Prior to Camara the warrant
32. The Court explained
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant
to search be obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a
particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional man-
date of reasonableness....
. . . In determining whether a particular inspection is reason-
able--and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to is-
sue a warrant for that inspection-the need for the inspection must be
weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35; see also id. at 534-39 (discussing flexibility of prob-
able cause standard as applied to municipal inspection programs). This adapta-
tion of the warrant and probable cause requirements was first advocated by
Justice Douglas in his Frank dissent. See 359 U.S. at 383 ('"Te test of 'prob-
able cause' required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the na-
ture of the search that is being sought.").
33. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. To fully satisfy the warrant clause, of course,
an administrative warrant is required based on flexible probable cause.
34. The Camara majority provided the following example of how its
newly defined probable cause would function in fourth amendment analysis:
[I]n a criminal investigation, the police may undertake to recover spe-
cific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest would
hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the
hope that these goods might be found. Consequently, a search for
these goods, even with a warrant, is "reasonable" only when there is
"probable cause" to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular
dwelling.
Id. at 535.
35. The Court's new definition of probable cause thus provided at least a
semantical solution to Frank's dilemma of how to maintain a warrant clause
emphasis while extending the amendment to include government intrusions
lacking particularized suspicion.
36. The dissent quickly pointed out that the majority's balancing of gov-
ernmental and individual interests mirrored Justice Frankfurter's reasoning
in Frank as to why such inspections were reasonable. 387 U.S. at 554 (Clark,
J., dissenting) ("It is interesting to note that the factors the Court relies upon
are the identical ones my Brother Frankfurter gave for excusing warrants in
Frank v. Maryland."). Given that the Court utilized the same criteria under
1988]
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clause had dictated the meaning of the reasonableness clause.
A search or arrest was reasonable only when a warrant based
on probable cause issued. Camara, in contrast, reversed the
roles of probable cause and reasonableness.37 Instead of prob-
able cause defining a reasonable search, after Camara, reasona-
bleness, in the form of a balancing test, defined probable
cause.38 Allowing reasonableness to define probable cause ex-
panded the range of acceptable government behavior beyond
intrusions based on individualized suspicion to include activities
in which the government interest outweighed the individual's
privacy interests. Reasonableness, in the form of a balancing
test, had finally gained entrance into fourth amendment analy-
sis, albeit through the back door of the warrant clause.3 9
either the Frank or Camara approach, the Camara dissent argued that the ma-
jority was simply adding a redundant procedural hurdle in the form of a
search warrant:
I ask: Why go through such an exercise, such a pretense? As the
same essentials are being followed under the present procedures, I
ask: Why the ceremony, the delay, the expense, the abuse of the
search warrant? ... I submit that the identical grounds for action
elaborated today give more support--both legal and practical-to the
present practice as approved in Frank ... than they do to this legalis-
tic facade that the Court creates.
Id. at 554-55.
37. Traditional probable cause was now an example of the "controlling
standard of reasonableness," rather than its defining component. Id. at 539.
38. Justice White elaborated: "The warrant procedure is designed to
guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable
governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a
valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is prob-
able cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." Id.
39. The novelty of the majority's leap in redefining probable cause was
hardly acknowledged. Indeed, its holding was cast as fulfilling the "historic
purpose" behind the fourth amendment. Id. at 539. The new definition was
spawned by way of an unstated analogy to administrative agency subpoenas of
corporate records and a cf. citation to Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wall-
ing, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). See Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. The majority also in-
voked the subpoena analogy in Camara's companion case, See v. Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (upholding administrative warrant requirement for fire in-
spection of business premises).
The administrative subpoena cases like Oklahoma Press do not provide
the staunchest support for Camara. A surface similarity exists in that both
are aimed at allowing administrative enforcement of regulations. The differ-
ences, however, are significant. First, the Oklahoma Press Court stressed that
it was dealing with corporate papers and not an "actual search" and that cor-
porations are subject to greater legislative control than individuals. 327 U.S. at
195, 209. Camara, in contrast, involved the physical inspection of a private resi-
dence. 387 U.S. at 525. Moreover, the Oklahoma Press majority justified its
lax probable cause standard in part on the premise that fourth amendment
protection against production of corporate papers was at best minimal and may
not even apply. 327 U.S. at 208. The Camara Court, however, rejected similar
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C. TERRY. ENTHRONING THE REASONABLENESS BALANCING
TEST
Building upon Camara, the Court's decision in Terry v.
Ohio4 provided reasonableness an even greater role as an in-
dependent factor in fourth amendment analysis. Although in
Terry the Court returned to the more familiar fourth amend-
ment area of criminal investigations, the novelty of Terry's set-
ting-a police stop and frisk on less than probable cause-
raised a number of parallels to Camara.41 As in Camara the
Court first had to decide whether the fourth amendment even
extended to the government behavior at issue. Interpreting the
fourth amendment's purpose expansively, the Terry Court re-
jected the state's argument that a stop and frisk was not a
search and seizure under the amendment.4 Instead, the Court
ruled that the procedures involved not a mere "petty indignity"
but a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person."43
Having held that the fourth amendment applied to a stop
and frisk, the difficult question of how to extend the amend-
ment's protections remained. The legitimate need to conduct
weapon frisks with less than traditional probable cause ruled
out traditional warrant clause analysis." Consequently, the
Court was forced, as in Camara, to either adapt the warrant
and probable cause requirements to a new situation or adopt an
entirely new standard.
In making its choice, the Terry Court did not rely on the
Camara adaptation of the warrant clause reflected in the flexi-
ble probable cause standard45 but decided instead that the war-
rant clause simply did not apply to the police conduct at issue.
reasoning in Frank, arguing that, "we cannot agree that the Fourth Amend-
ment interests at stake in these inspections cases are merely 'peripheral.' It is
surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior." 387 U.S. at 530 (footnote omitted).
40. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41. The issue of stop and frisks had received extensive attention from
commentators. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 40 n.4 (1968) (citing 48 arti-
cles, student notes, and books).
42. 392 U.S. at 16-17, 19.
43. Id. at 17; see also id. at 24-25 (even limited searches severely intrude
on cherished personal security).
44. See id. at 24.
45. Professor LaFave has argued that Terry would have been more prop-
erly decided by using Camara's flexible probable cause standard, although he
concludes that the result would have been the same. LaFave, supra note 41, at
54-56.
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Quick, responsive police action based upon the officer's on-the-
spot observation of suspicious activity traditionally had not
been, nor could it be as a practical matter, subject to the war-
rant requirement. 46 Because of these considerations and per-
haps daunted by the prospect of redefining probable cause as a
different level of suspicion, the majority decided that the rea-
sonableness clause's "general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures" should control. 47
That decision posed an additional analytical problem for
the Court. Because the Court had not previously relied upon
reasonableness as an independent fourth amendment factor, it
did not have a reasonableness test to utilize. As a result, the
Court turned to its closest example of a reasonableness balanc-
ing test-the Camara definition of probable cause.48 The Court
explained that the reasonableness of the officer's stop and frisk
should be judged by balancing the government's interests
against those of the individual. The Court thus made Camara's
flexible definition of probable cause the very definition of
reasonableness. 49
The Court applied its balancing test to stop and frisks and,
after weighing the competing interests, decided that stopping
46. The Court explained:
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause
of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether
"probable cause" existed to justify the search and seizure which took
place. However, that is not the case.... [W]e deal here with an en-
tire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon
the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which histori-
cally has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to
the warrant procedure.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
47. Id.
48. Chief Justice Warren expounded:
[To assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as a
general proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the govern-
mental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen," for there is
"no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balanc-
ing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search
[or seizure] entails. Camara v. Municipal Court."
Id. at 20-21 (quoting 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)).
49. Even in Camara the Court's flexible definition of probable cause had
threatened to make probable cause simply a synonym for reasonableness. As
with the Court's adoption of a flexible probable cause standard in Camara, see
supra note 39, the Terry majority did not expressly acknowledge the adoption
of a controlling reasonableness standard as an innovative step. Indeed, if one
was unaware of the history leading up to Camara and Terry, one would as-
sume that the balancing test was a long established mode of fourth amend-
ment analysis. Justice Harlan, in contrast, expressly recognized that the Court
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an individual and frisking for weapons was justified if "reason-
able suspicion" existed that the suspect was armed and danger-
ous and that crime was afoot.50 The Court's new standard of
reasonable suspicion rested somewhere between traditional
probable cause and no suspicion at all. Terry's innovativeness,
therefore, not only provided reasonableness and its balancing
test a greatly enhanced role in fourth amendment analysis but
also created a whole new benchmark of individualized
suspicion.51
II. FAILING THE CHALLENGES OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION: THE
LEGACY OF CAMARA AND TERRY
Camara and Terry constituted innovative departures from
a fourth amendment mentality that had restricted the amend-
ment's coverage in the name of maintaining the warrant
clause's rigorous protections. In this sense the Court's willing-
was dealing with an "important new field of law." Terry, 392 U.S. at 31
(Harlan, J., concurring).
Given the paucity of cases upholding a general reasonableness approach to
the fourth amendment, especially in the area of criminal investigations, see
supra notes 9-14, it is not surprising that the Court was only able to cite di-
rectly to Camara and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Elkins pro-
vides little support, however, despite its language that "what the Constitution
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id. at 222. The Elkcins Court was focusing on the proper use of the
exclusionary rule and not the appropriate role of probable cause within the
fourth amendment. Id. at 208. Although the exclusionary rule is certainly en-
twined with broader fourth amendment considerations, the issue of whether
the exclusionary rule should apply does not necessarily involve the same ques-
tions as the issue of whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred. Fur-
thermore, the Court's reliance on Camara, a case with qupstionable pedigree
itself, is curious in that Camara was, at least in form, a warrant clause and
probable cause case even if it arguably had a rule of reasonableness holding at
heart. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
50. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22.
51. Justice Douglas cast the lone dissenting vote, finding it "a mystery
how [a] 'search' and... 'seizure' can be constitutional by Fourth Amendment
standards, unless there was 'probable cause."' Id. at 35. His dissent strongly
reflected the Court's traditional view that the fourth amendment requirement
of probable cause was the definition of a reasonable search or seizure under
the fourth amendment and not simply a factor underlying a general reasona-
bleness test. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text. Justice Douglas ar-
gued, therefore, that even if a warrant was excused because of exigent
circumstances, probable cause was still required. Terry, 392 U.S. at 37. From
Justice Douglas's viewpoint, "the compromise" between the government and
individuals' interests had already been struck within the fourth amendment
through "the rule of probable cause .... the meaning of [which] is deeply em-
bedded in our constitutional history." Id- at 36 n.3, 37.
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ness in Camara and Terry to face the unique fourth amend-
ment problems posed by government activities like housing
inspections and stop and frisks is admirable. Two decades later,
however, it has become evident that those decisions came at a
price. The combined effect of Camara and Terry is the major
reason the Court has failed to meet the first challenge of defin-
ing a rational relationship between the warrant and reasonable-
ness clauses that fulfills the amendment's purposes.
The Court's basic inability to agree on when to use a rea-
sonableness standard instead of traditional probable cause evi-
dences its failure in defining the relationship between the
warrant and reasonableness clauses.52 Since Camara and Terry
introduced reasonableness as an independent factor in fourth
amendment analysis, the Justices have continually exchanged
charges that the Court's interpretation of the role of reasona-
bleness is too broad or too narrow.5 3 During the 1986-1987
Term alone, the Court was divided deeply in all four cases that
raised the question of whether a reasonableness balancing test
should apply.5
52. The criticism that the Court cannot agree on when to use a reasona-
bleness standard rather than traditional probable cause is not simply an obser-
vation of how the Court and the case law method operate. See Amsterdam,
supra note 5, at 349-52 (acknowledging difficulty of developing consistent
fourth amendment doctrine through case law method). It would be an en-
tirely different situation if the Court, through a series of cases, explained the
rule of reasonableness' role and why it applied to particular situations. In-
stead, the Court has been unable to agree on how the rule applies and why,
resulting in the rule's expansion by default.
53. Compare, for example, the different justices' opinions in New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1985) (searching student's purse reasonable
under the circumstances); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (search-
ing passenger compartment reasonable to uncover weapons); Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (allowing citizen to be detained while officers
executed valid search warrant not unreasonable); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (searching suspect improper during pick up for questioning
without probable cause); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977)
(searching driver reasonable when policeman noticed large bulge under
driver's jacket); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975) (searching
motorists at Border Patrol checkpoints away from border unreasonable with-
out probable cause).
One could even argue that the disagreement regarding the role of reasona-
bleness began with Terry itself, when Justice Douglas refused to apply
Camara's balancing in assessing the constitutionality of stop and frisks. See
supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
54. See Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987) (6-3 decision striking down
search of stolen stereo on less than probable cause); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107
S. Ct. 3164 (1987) (5-4 decision upholding warrantless search of probationer's
home on less than probable cause); New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987)
(6-3 decision upholding warrantless searches of automobile junkyards for sto-
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Although commentators have advanced many explanations
as to why current fourth amendment analysis is in disarray,5 5
they have overlooked the primary cause. The Court in Camara
and Terry embraced the reasonableness balancing test in a
manner that conceptually weakened probable cause and failed
to provide any long-term guidance or limits for the future role
of reasonableness. Given such analytical shortcomings, the
Court's inability to meet the first challenge of fourth amend-
ment interpretation was inevitable.
A. CAMARA: CHANGING THE NATURE AND ROLE
OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Camara's analytical shortcoming was not the rejection of
traditional probable cause in favor of a reasonableness stan-
dard.5 6 Rather, the problem lies with the Court's decision to
bring the reasonableness balancing test into fourth amendment
analysis through the portal of probable cause. In its historical
fourth amendment role, traditional probable cause defined
reasonableness. After Camara, traditional probable cause
presented only one type of probable cause, one way of demon-
strating reasonableness. 57 Even conceding the necessity of re-
ducing the dominance of traditional probable cause in fourth
amendment analysis to bring housing inspections under the
amendment, the holding did not need to take away an in-
dependent role for traditional probable cause and make it a
function of reasonableness. 58 By doing so, the Court unnecessa-
rily diluted the meaning of probable cause and weakened the
amendment's privacy protections.
len vehicles); O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987) (5-4 decision uphold-
ing search of government employee's office on less than probable cause); see
also infra note 73 (analyzing 1986-1987 Term cases).
55. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 350-51 (attributing lack of clarity
in part to nature of Supreme Court's decision-making process); Bradley, supra
note 2, at 1470-73 (noting the Court's rulings respond in part to exclusionary
rule's applicability if violation found); Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 257, 259-
64 (arguing change in composition of Court has led to different treatment of
fourth amendment issues).
56. If the housing inspections in Camara were to be brought under the
amendment and remain effective, the Court could not have required tradi-
tional probable cause. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 34 (use by Camara Court of home search for criminal
evidence as an example of situation to which traditional probable cause would
apply).
58. Conceptually, traditional probable cause no longer controlled the
meaning of reasonableness but was one possible outcome after a weighing of
various factors.
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The Court made no effort to delineate the continuing role
of traditional probable cause, even as part of the reasonableness
balancing test, in fourth amendment analysis. The Court did
not establish a presumption in favor of traditional probable
cause or draw any clear lines regarding when it.is absolutely re-
quired. The Court stated only that a police search of a home
for criminal evidence was an example of when a balancing of
governmental and individual interests would require traditional
probable cause.59 After Camara, traditional probable cause de-
pended on an ill-defined balancing of governmental and indi-
vidual interests. The reasonableness balancing test had pushed
traditional probable cause off center stage and given it an un-
certain supporting role.
Redefining probable cause to include government justifica-
tions independent of suspicious activity not only conceptually
diminished the role of traditional probable cause in fourth
amendment analysis but also diluted its meaning in a way that
created a new receptiveness to government intrusions. The
amendment provides probable cause as an example of the
proper relation between the government's power of intrusion
and citizens' privacy interests. Traditional probable cause de-
fined a specific scenario required before a government intrusion
was justified: the subject of the search or seizure must have ac-
ted suspiciously, and the government must have been aware of
that behavior before the government, in response, could single
the individual out for government action. Probable cause's re-
sponsive nature thus established a presumption against al-
lowing government intrusions60  by requiring that the
government's intrusion be premised on a probability of wrong-
doing. In the process probable cause also provided the individ-
59. See supra note 34.
60. Indeed, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court
explained that
the magistrate's scrutiny [under the warrant requirement] is intended
to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause. The
premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is
an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior
determination of necessity.
Id. at 467 (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 572 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Under the Fourth
Amendment... the status quo is nonintrusion, for as a general matter, it is
unreasonable to subject the average citizen or his property to search or
seizure. Thus, minimization of intrusion only lessens the aggravation to Fourth
Amendment interests; it certainly does not further those interests.").
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ual "the right to be let alone"61 because the government's
power to intrude depended upon the individual's actions rather
than the government's justification, enabling an individual to
keep the government at bay by avoiding suspicious behavior.
After Camara, in contrast, the government could base
probable cause on completely innocent activities.6 2 As a result
the fourth amendment no longer revolved around a concept
that unambiguously emphasized both nonintrusion by the gov-
ernment and an individual's right to privacy. Changing prob-
able cause's definition by eliminating its responsive nature
subtly shifted the fourth amendment's orientation toward
favoring government intrusions.
B. TERRY. CREATING THE REFUGE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION
Terry hastened traditional probable cause's conceptual fall
from prominence in fourth amendment analysis. As in
Camara, the Terry holding's difficulty lies not with its decision
to modify probable cause's role in the analysis but with how it
accomplished the accommodation to allow police stop and
frisks.
Historically, the Court relied on the warrant clause to ana-
lyze the validity of searches or seizures based on individualized
suspicion. Although exigent circumstances might permit the
modification of the warrant requirement in the name of reason-
ableness, the analysis focused on whether a warrant based on
probable cause was obtained. Any question over the adequacy
of the suspicion revolved around probable cause as the center of
the inquiry.63
In Terry, however, the Court spurned the warrant clause
and traditional yardstick of probable cause, turning instead to
the reasonableness clause and the balancing test appropriated
from Camara. Under that approach the Court reached the
standard of reasonable suspicion not by carving out an excep-
tion to probable cause based on exigent circumstances but by
independently balancing under a reasonableness standard. The
61. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758-59 (1985); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 362 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546-55 (automobile checkpoints
for illegal aliens); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967)
(housing inspections).
63. It is not at all clear that the Court would have even entertained an
argument to modify probable cause prior to the Camara and Terry era. See
supra notes 11, 18-20 and accompanying text. But cf. note 39 (Court redefined
probable cause with little acknowledgement of change).
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central inquiry had changed from whether an exception to
probable cause was appropriate under the facts to what stan-
dard the Court should adopt to allow the government's
intrusion.64
The change in focus from probable cause as the fourth
amendment's primary definition of the proper level of suspicion
to probable cause as a factor in a broader balancing test created
the potential of a much greater role for reasonable suspicion.65
Instead of carving out a narrow exception to probable cause,
reasonable suspicion became a valid compromise standard that
comports with the fourth amendment if the Court decides that,
after balancing the interests, it is reasonable. The government
no longer argues against a presumed starting point of probable
cause but rather argues for reasonable suspicion as a reasonable
accommodation of competing interests. Probable cause be-
comes merely one point on a continuum of reasonableness.
The Court's holding in New Jersey v. TL.O. 66 demonstrates
the attractiveness of using reasonable suspicion as a compro-
mise position. In T.L.O. the Court debated the proper standard
for allowing the search of a student. Lower courts' holdings
had ranged from requiring probable cause to allowing searches
without any suspicion at all.67 The majority observed that
lower courts had "struggled to accommodate" the students' pri-
vacy interests with the competing states' interests in providing
a safe educational environment, a struggle sometimes resolved,
in the majority's words, "by giving full force to one or the other
64. The Terry majority stated that "the notion" underlying probable cause
remained "fully relevant." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 70 (1968). Prior to Terry,
probable cause was not only relevant, it was controlling. See Jacobs & Stros-
sen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion; A Constitutional
and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 595,
631-32 (1985) (criticizing the Court's balancing approach which "markedly di-
minishes fundamental, historically rooted, fourth amendment protection").
65. The potential misuse of reasonable suspicion is exacerbated by the
laxness of the standard itself: "'Police power exercised without probable cause
is arbitrary. To say that the police may accost citizens at their whim and may
detain them upon reasonable suspicion is to say, in reality, that the police may
both accost and detain citizens at their whim.'" Amsterdam, supra note 5, at
395 (quoting the Amicus Curiae Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund at
56-59, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67-1161)); see also United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 889-90 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing
cases in which reasonable suspicion used as the "flimsiest of justifications");
Terry, 387 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (" 'probable cause' rings a bell of
certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as 'reasonable suspicion' ").
66. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
67. Id. at 332 n.2.
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side of the balance. '68 The very idea of giving full force to only
one side of the balance, however, suggests unreasonableness.
Not surprisingly, given this characterization of how some lower
courts resolved the issue, the T.L.O. majority adopted a compro-
mise position of reasonable suspicion.69
The problem with the middle position of reasonable suspi-
cion is that it invariably sounds reasonable because its essence
is a compromise between the government's need to intrude and
the individual's privacy interest. The standard's middle posi-
tion between a suspicionless search and requiring probable
cause appears to accommodate the interests of the government
and the individual equally. The probable cause standard, on
the other hand, when considered apart from the fourth amend-
ment's underlying values, overemphasizes the individual's pri-
vacy interest because it holds the government to such a strict
standard of justification. A court rejecting reasonable suspicion
in favor of probable cause would seem to be focusing on only
one side of the balance, and yet the very idea of balancing im-
plies that each side has some merit.70
The majority's arrival at a reasonable suspicion standard in
Terry through a balancing test independent of an inquiry
grounded in probable cause thus set the stage for an expansive
role for reasonable suspicion. At a minimum Terry placed
probable cause in a much broader context of reasonableness.
Indeed, considering Camara and Terry together, the reasona-
bleness balancing test closes in on traditional probable cause
from all sides. If the Court uses the warrant clause, the reason-
ableness balancing test controls the inquiry in the guise of flex-
ible probable cause; traditional probable cause serves as only
one example of probable cause. If the Court utilizes the rea-
sonableness clause, the same balancing test controls, again pre-
cluding any independent role for traditional probable cause.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The district court's adoption in Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986), of a reasonable suspicion standard for drug testing of
firefighters shows a court striking a compromise between requiring no suspi-
cion or adopting probable cause. "The state's interest will not be significantly
impaired by the individualized reasonable suspicion standard. The standard is
not unduly burdensome.... Further, the imposition of an individualized, rea-
sonable suspicion standard rather than the more stringent probable cause stan-
dard is already a significant concession of deference to the state's legitimate
interests." Id. at 1518; see also Everett v. Napper, 825 F.2d 341, 345 (11th Cir.
1987) (concluding reasonable suspicion is the "standard that has emerged" for
urinalysis testing of public employees).
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Through Camara and Terry, traditional probable cause surren-
dered the fourth amendment limelight to the broad inquiry of
reasonableness.
C. CAMARA AND TERRY'S CONCEPTUAL CHANGES IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS COME TO FRUITION
The Court's apparent failure to recognize the potential im-
port of its holdings in Camara and Terry heightened the impact
of their conceptual changes in fourth amendment interpreta-
tion. Both cases significantly altered the traditional relationship
between the reasonableness and warrant clauses, and yet the
Court did not address their implications beyond the relatively
discrete areas of housing inspections and stop and frisks.
71
That several of the Justices who have protested most vocally to
expanding the reasonableness balancing test concurred in Terry
and Camara-the cases which made the expansion possible 72-
best evidences the Court's failure to appreciate the implications
71. The Camara majority purported to invoke the balancing test for all
fourth amendment inquiries, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text, but
did not address the broad implications of subjecting every category of search
or seizure to a weighing of government interests and individual privacy rights.
The Court may have assumed that Camara would primarily be limited to ad-
ministrative search cases, see infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text, or that
appropriate limitations would develop in future case law. Neither assumption
has proven to be valid. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
Although the Terry majority did not fully acknowledge the novelty of its
approach, see supra note 49, its opinion did evidence an awareness of the need
to proceed cautiously. The majority opinion began with an unusually detailed
recitation of the facts giving rise to the case and specifically limited its holding
to the facts presented. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4-8, 15-16 (1968). The major-
ity dealt only with the constitutional propriety of the pat down, expressly de-
clining to address whether an investigative stop alone on less than probable
cause would be valid. Id. at 19 n.16. Moreover, when the majority did address
the validity of the frisk, it emphasized with painstaking detail how officer Mc-
Fadden had only patted down Terry's outer clothing and "confin[ed] his search
strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were
armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons." Id. at 30. The
Court further emphasized the narrowness of its holding in Terry by using the
companion case, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968), as a contrasting
example of a police officer who had not formulated reasonable suspicion that
the defendant was armed and had not carefully limited his pat down for weap-
ons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
72. Both Justices Douglas and Brennan, who drafted the flexible probable
cause standard eventually adopted in Camara, later opposed a broadening of
the reasonableness balancing test's scope. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 361-63 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing reasonableness
standard as an unprecedented departure from fourth amendment standards);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 888 (1975) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (opposing extension of Terry "suspicion" test to the stop of moving vehi-
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of the changes at the time they were made. 3 The Court had
unloosed reasonableness but seemed uncertain about where the
des). Justice Brennan in particular has argued that the "balancing test" that
originated in Camara has been extended far beyond its intended scope.
One cannot help noting that the alarms being sounded are similar to the
Frank Court's prophesies in opposing the application of the fourth amendment
to inspections, see suprra note 20. These concerns were dismissed by the
Camara majority as unfounded-
It has been suggested [by the dissent] that so to vary the probable
cause test from the standard applied in criminal cases would be to au-
thorize a 'synthetic search warrant' and thereby to lessen the overall
protections of the Fourth Amendment. But we do not agree....
[R]easonableness is ... the ultimate standard.
387 U.S. at 538-39 (citation omitted); see also Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 264
(stating Terry Court would not have approved of extensions of balancing test
"made in its name").
73. The unrecognized implications of the Camara and Terry decisions
have resulted in an ongoing tug-of-war over the role of reasonableness in
which the Court allows the balancing test to expand at times and backs away
at others. Compare, for example, the Court's decisions in Arizona v. Hicks,
107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), and O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987). In Hicks
a police officer with reasonable suspicion that a stereo was stolen turned over
the stereo components to record the serial numbers. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia declared that searches and seizures can proceed on less than
probable cause only if "the seizure is minimally intrusive and operational ne-
cessities render it the only practicable means." 107 S. Ct. at 1154. Justice
Scalia found that these conditions were not met in the present case; conse-
quently, the police officer's actions violated the fourth amendment. Id. at
1154-55.
The majority opinion engendered a strong dissent in which Justice
O'Connor argued that because the officer's cursory inspection was the only
means of detecting whether the stereo was stolen, the officer should be al-
lowed to undertake such a minimal intrusion based on only reasonable suspi-
cion. Id. at 1158. She concluded that the majority's "bright-line" rule would
"severeply] damage... legitimate and effective law enforcement." Id. at 1160.
Before the death knell for a broad balancing approach could sound too
loudly, however, the Court handed down its decision in O'Connor. A plurality
in O'Connor held that a "reasonableness standard," rather than probable
cause, applied to a government employer's search of an employee's office. 107
S. Ct. at 1502. Justice O'Connor, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Hicks,
argued for the plurality that once it is determined that the fourth amendment
applies, the first step is to balance the competing interests. Id. at 1499. Find-
ing that a probable cause requirement "would impose intolerable burdens on
public employers" and that the work place intrusion was "'relatively lim-
ited,"' id. at 1502 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 537), the plurality concluded
that a reasonableness standard best satisfied competing government and indi-
vidual interests. Id. The four dissenters maintained that the traditional war-
rant and probable cause requirements could be abandoned in favor of
balancing only when no other practical alternative existed and that O'Connor
was not such a case. Id. at 1511 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The narrow view
of balancing which had appeared to prevail in Hicks thus gave way to a much
looser balancing standard in O'Connor, with strong disagreement regarding
the proper situation for balancing. As Hicks and O'Connor well illustrate, the
debate goes on.
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new doctrine was going or how to constrain it. What was cer-
tain, however, was that each subsequent case would add to the
controversy over the proper realm of probable cause and the
reasonableness balancing test, further fracturing fourth amend-
ment analysis.
The ultimate problem, of course, and the reason the rule of
reasonableness has expanded inexorably, is that Camara and
Terry did not place any inherent limitations on the rule.
Camara equated probable cause with a reasonableness balanc-
ing test, and Terry extended the Camara balancing test to cases
not covered by the warrant and probable cause requirements.
Given the reasoning in Camara and Terry, efforts to preserve
the role of traditional probable cause against encroachment by
a reasonableness analysis must center on limiting the cases'
holdings to the unique situations they presented. Attempts at
such limitations, however, have proven illusory and unwork-
able, and have only exacerbated the Court's piecemeal ap-
proach to fourth amendment analysis.
1. Camara and Administrative Searches
Although the majority opinion in Camara expressly em-
braced reasonableness as the guiding value for all fourth
amendment cases, Camara frequently has been characterized as
limited to a genre of cases involving so-called administrative or
regulatory searches.74 Proponents of such a view apparently as-
sume that by restraining Camara's holding to administrative
searches, they can salvage the role of traditional probable
cause.
As an initial matter, characterizing Camara as an adminis-
trative search case ignores the holding's symbolic impact in re-
casting fourth amendment analysis in broad reasonableness
concepts.75 More basically, terms like administrative search or
74. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) (refusing to
apply Camara standard to full-scale car searches at check points); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (refusing to 'apply Camara
standard to roving border searches). See generally LaFave, Administrative
Searches and the Fourth Amendment The Camara and See Cases, 1967 SuP.
CT. REV. 1; Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An
Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 856 (1979);
Note, The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Inspections, 16 Hous. L.
REV. 399 (1979).
75. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. A review of the
Supreme Court's decisions over the past decade reveals a pervasive reliance on
Camara's balancing principle, even in cases outside the realm of administra-
tive searches. Thus, even if the specific holding in Camara is characterized as
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inspection are neither self-defining nor self-limiting. Their ex-
pansion may ultimately result in fewer privacy protections for
individuals.
The term administrative search typically describes inspec-
tions carried out according to a preexisting scheme established
by statute or regulation.7 6 Defining the term in that fashion,
however, is simply descriptive and only begs the question of
whether the government's justification is sufficient or whether
individualized suspicion should be required. Routine or regula-
tory procedures may not pose a grave danger of forcible entries
and searches, but they may raise a significant fourth amend-
ment danger by allowing the government to "pr[y] more and
more into [one's] private affairs" 77 on a regular basis. Simply
describing a government activity as administrative, therefore,
should not automatically lower the Court's fourth amendment
guard.78
limited to administrative warrant settings, its implications for a broader role
for reasonableness have pervaded the Court's fourth amendment perspective.
This effect was compounded when the Court later embraced the balancing test
in Terry. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1986) (using
Camara standard to allow automobile search); United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (using reasonableness standard for airport
customs searches for narcotics); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)
(adopting Camara and Terry concepts in school searches); Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1045-47 (1983) (adopting Terry standard in protective search of
automobile interior and trunk); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
579, 588 (1983) (using reasonableness test in allowing warrantless search of
sailboat); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (adopting reasona-
bleness test for personal weapons search).
76. See C. WHrrEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 9, at 267-68. Even this
simple definition of what constitutes an administrative search is not univer-
sally accepted. For example, TL.O., the school search case, has been charac-
terized as a regulatory search, id. at 291-93, although no regulations allowing a
search were relied upon. The regulatory search characterization apparently
stems from the fact that the school search was not in a street crime setting.
Id. at 292. If all intrusions taking place outside a street crime setting are sub-
ject to an administrative search rationale, then Camara's scope is especially
broad.
77. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. Justice Rehnquist aptly made the point in rejecting a similar rationale
for upholding warrantless searches of stone quarries. Although concurring in
the result, Justice Rehnquist did not find the majority's reliance on pervasive
congressional regulation to be an adequate rationale:
I do not believe, however, that the warrantless entry authorized
by Congress in this case, § 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, can be justified by the Court's rationale. The
Court holds that warrantless searches of stone quarries are permitted
because the mining industry has been pervasively regulated. But I
have no doubt that had Congress enacted a criminal statute similar to
that involved here-authorizing, for example, unannounced warrant-
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The Court also has indicated that the administrative nature
of a search may depend in part on whether the government's
objective is penal, emphasizing the criminal punishment of spe-
cific acts, or regulatory, focusing on the enforcement of rules
apart from penal sanctions.79 For example, in Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 0 Justice Powell labeled random searches for
illegal aliens at a border checkpoint "administrative" based on
the argument that the government undertook the searches
"primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorial pur-
poses."''s Justice Powell cited the low rate of prosecution as the
factor that differentiated border searches from random area
searches, which he characterized as "'fishing expeditions' for
evidence to support prosecution. '8 2
Even if the penal versus regulatory distinction could con-
strain the Camara Court's analysis, the government retains in-
ordinate power to dictate which fourth amendment standard
applies. If the government can conduct an administrative
search to uncover criminal evidence so long as its use of the evi-
dence will be primarily administrative or the search's abstract
goal is regulatory, the government has tremendous leeway to
engage in intrusions normally requiring traditional probable
cause. Although the scope of the intrusion is exactly the
same,83 the government can, by simply classifying its purpose as
less searches of property reasonably thought to house unlawful drug
activity-the warrantless search would be struck down under our ex-
isting Fourth Amendment line of decisions. This Court would invali-
date the search despite the fact that Congress has a strong interest in
regulating and preventing drug-related crime and has in fact perva-
sively regulated such crime for a longer period of time than it has reg-
ulated mining.
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 608 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
79. See New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2650 (1987) (discussing regu-
latory and administrative purpose of statute allowing searches of junkyards);
see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294-95 (1984) (distinguishing be-
tween administrative and conventional search warrants based on whether ob-
jective of search is criminal evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504-05
(1978) (discussing whether search's intent was administrative or criminal);
Note, supra note 15, at 1128, 1131 (tracing Court's use of civil-criminal distinc-
tion as fourth amendment dividing line).
80. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
81. Id. at 278 (Powell, J., concurring).
82. Id.; see also Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2655 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing purely administrative searches and searches used to obtain criminal
evidence). But see United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 873 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Higginbotham, J., concurring) (questioning whether, given checkpoint's pur-
pose, administrative warrant appropriate for illegal alien checkpoint).
83. See generally Note, supra note 15, at 1135-37 (attacking assumption
that civil searches are less intrusive because criminal consequences are lack-
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administrative and using nonpenal sanctions, circumvent the
traditional probable cause requirement.84 Moreover, even if the
ing). An argument that the degree of intrusion is less for an administrative
search must turn on the contention that the lack of criminal consequences les-
sens the subjective nature of the intrusion. This assumption is not necessarily
true, see infra note 85 and accompanying text, nor valid once the issue focused
upon is the individual's privacy interest. See infra notes 88-89, 155-56 and ac-
companying text; Note, supra note 15, at 1135-37.
84. In New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987), for example, the state
"inspected" automobile junkyards for stolen vehicles without a warrant or
probable cause. Id. at 2639-40. The majority upheld the search even though
the stolen property itself did not fall under the administrative scheme. Id. at
2651-52. The effect of the majority's reasoning, as the dissent noted, was to
implicitly [hold] that if an administrative scheme has certain goals
and if the search serves those goals, it may be upheld even if no con-
crete administrative consequences could follow from a particular
search. This is a dangerous suggestion, for the goals of administrative
schemes often overlap with the goals of the criminal law. Thus, on
the Court's reasoning, administrative inspections would evade the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment so long as they served an ab-
stract administrative goal, such as the prevention of automobile theft.
A legislature cannot abrogate constitutional protections simply by say-
ing that the purpose of an administrative search scheme is to prevent
a certain type of crime.
Id. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also raised the "more diffi-
cult question" of
whether a state could take any criminal conduct, make it an adminis-
trative violation, and then search without probable cause for viola-
tions of the newly created administrative rule. The increasing overlap
of administrative and criminal violations creates an obvious tempta-
tion for the state to do so, and plainly toleration of this type of pretex-
tual search would allow an end-run around the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 2657 n.17.
The case of Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), also demonstrates
the potential abuse of an administrative-penal distinction. In Abel the FBI
was unable to obtain sufficient evidence to arrest the defendant on espionage
charges. Id. at 221. As an alternative the FBI contacted and cooperated with
the INS in obtaining an administrative arrest warrant, issued by the district
director of the INS, to hold Abel for deportation. Id. at 222. The INS agents
conducted an extensive search in conjunction with the administrative arrest
while FBI agents observed. Id. at 223, 225. The evidence obtained during the
INS "administrative" search was later used to convict Abel on criminal
charges. Id. at 225.
A majority of the Court upheld the INS search as an administrative
search to establish deportability, finding no "bad faith" in the FBI's and INS's
cooperation. Id. at 240. The four dissenters, in contrast, found that "[t]he dis-
tinction [between civil and criminal] is rather hollow here, where the proofs
that turn up are in fact given in evidence in a criminal prosecution." Id. at 254
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Although the debate in Abel mainly went to the fourth amendment's ap-
plicability to INS searches in the aftermath of Frank, the concerns are similar
even if the fourth amendment now clearly applies. The government has the
ability to circumvent more stringent fourth amendment protections by invok-
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government's primary purpose is regulatory, penal sanctions
often do attach when violations are found or the search is
refused.8 5
Allowing the intrusion's purpose to govern the appropriate
analysis can only encourage fourth amendment game playing,
either through the creative use of administrative penalties or
the invocation of regulatory purposes that overlap with penal
goals.8 6 For instance, a school system could justify testing stu-
dents for drugs as part of a school medical examination and la-
bel the consequences, such as forced treatment, suspension, or
expulsion, as nonpunitive measures aimed at helping the stu-
dents. In contrast, if such testing was conducted solely to ob-
tain evidence of criminal use of drugs, the procedure would run
into the traditional probable cause requirement. By recasting
the purpose, however, the government can now assert that the
ing an administrative search label. For a general discussion of Abel, see J.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 255-58 (1966).
85. This problem of sanctions was actually noted by the Camara majority
in rejecting the argument advanced in Frank that housing inspections were
only at the periphery of the fourth amendment. Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967). Moreover, the penalties resulting from an administra-
tive search may be substantial. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(1) (1982) (fines of up to $25,000 per day of violation or up to one year
imprisonment or both); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d) (Supp. 1985) (fines of up to $50,000 per day of violation or up to five
years imprisonment or both). The Clean Water Act and the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act both make administrative searches essential to their
enforcement structure. 33 U.S.C. § 1318; 42 U.S.C. § 6927. And in Burger, of
course, the ultimate result of the administrative search was criminal prosecu-
tion for possession of stolen property. 107 S. Ct. at 2640.
86. One commentator has suggested that the manipulation of labels to
avoid probable cause requirements has taken place in justifying the military's
random urinalysis testing program:
The random tests are generally justified as "inspections" under
Military Rule of Evidence 313. These "inspections" purportedly deter-
mine the health, welfare, military fitness, good order, discipline and
readiness of the targeted military units. In theory, if the primary pur-
pose of the random sampling is to obtain evidence for use in a court-
martial or non-judicial disciplinary proceeding, the sampling is not an
"inspection," and the urinalysis results will be excluded. In practice,
however, random sweeps are conducted precisely to ferret out drug
users who will then be disciplined accordingly. Disobedience of an or-
der to provide a sample for a random sweep is itself a prosecutable
offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Abney, Drug Abuse, Court-Martial, and Random Urinalysis-An Unworkable
Combination, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1985) (footnotes omitted). Although mil-
itary inspections and searches pose unique problems, the potential for using la-
bels to avoid fourth amendment problems is analogous. See also infra note 156
(difficulty of using government's purpose to guide fourth amendment analy-
sis); infra note 178 (problem of using intrusiveness as basis for analysis).
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testing is part of an administrative scheme subject to lesser
fourth amendment standards.8 7
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the
penal-regulatory distinction misses Camara's point that
whatever the inspection's purpose, the intrusion still invades
the individual's privacy.88 Despite the terminology or sanctions
the government chooses, it is still intruding without particular-
ized suspicion. Allowing the search's administrative character
to guide fourth amendment analysis, rather than the govern-
ment's need for the intrusion, lets the administrative tail wag
the dog. The Court, therefore, should treat the sanctions in-
volved or the regulatory aspect of an inspection as secondary is-
sues that come into play only once the Court answers the main
question affirmatively: whether the government interest justi-
fies a suspicionless intrusion.8 9
2. Limiting Terry by the Level of Intrusion
Attempts to limit expansive use of Terry's reasonableness
balancing have focused on the level of intrusiveness involved in
the search or seizure. In Dunaway v. New York, 90 for example,
the defendant was picked up for custodial interrogation, rather
than formally arrested, because the police lacked probable
cause to obtain a warrant.91 Defending the legality of that con-
duct, the government argued that Terry had established "a
multifactor balancing test of 'reasonable police conduct under
the circumstances"' applicable to all seizures not qualifying as
87. See supra note 84; cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 1987) (justifying urinalysis testing of employ-
ees because it "serves primarily the administrative function of assessing suita-
bility" of job transfer). But see International Molders' & Allied Workers'
Local 164 v. Nelson, 674 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (describing as an
"Orwellian attempt" INS's description of warrant allowing "work place raids"
as "inspection warrant").
88. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). The ma-
jority opinion, however, did later rely on the fact that the search was not
aimed at criminal evidence to justify finding the inspection to be "relatively
limited." Id. at 537. See generally Note, supra note 15, at 1135-39 (arguing that
civil-criminal distinction is "senseless" given privacy interests).
89. Thus the Court should examine whether an administrative warrant is
required or whether the regulatory scheme is adequate only after first scruti-
nizing the government's purposes. Only if the Court finds the government's
purpose sufficient to justify an intrusion, see infra notes 133-39 and accompa-
nying text, should the means used become relevant. The same is true with the
sanctions and penalties involved.
90. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
91. Id. at 203.
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technical arrests.92 In rejecting the state's argument, the Duna-
way majority forcefully characterized Terry as a narrow excep-
tion to the general rule that probable cause applies. 93 The
majority reasoned that the Terry Court applied the balancing
test rather than the traditional probable cause standard only
because the intrusion involved in a stop and frisk "fell far short
of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest. ' 94 Focusing
on the intrusiveness of the conduct in question, the Dunaway
Court held that probable cause rather than the balancing test
in Terry applied because detention for custodial interrogation
was as intrusive as a formal arrest.95
The reasoning of Terry, however, ultimately undermines
any attempt to limit Terry by focusing on the level of intrusive-
ness. Despite the Terry Court's emphasis on the narrowness of
its holding, Terry's reliance on reasonableness as the fourth
amendment's guiding value for all searches and seizures meant
that the reasonableness balancing test lacked inherent limits.
Stressing this point in his Dunaway concurrence, Justice White
suggested that although Terry could be read as "an almost
unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of probable
cause," other cases had made clear that reasonableness-"the
balancing of competing interests"-was the key principle in
fourth amendment analysis.96
The Court came closest to embracing the full implication of
Terry-that the reasonableness balancing test governs all
searches and seizures-in New Jersey v. T.L.O.97 In T.L.O. the
Court for the first time applied the reasonableness balancing
92. Id. at 213.
93. Id. at 209.
94. Id. at 212, 214; see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97
(1975) (disallowing full-scale searches of cars at traffic checkpoints on less
than probable cause); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973) (disapproving random stops and searches of cars). Both Ortiz and Al-
meida-Sanchez, however, raised the possibility that with adequate discretion-
ary controls, car searches on less than traditional probable cause might be
valid. See Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 896 n.3; Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 279 (Powell,
J., concurring).
Justice Stewart in his dissent in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706
(1981)) (Stewart, J., dissenting), read Terry narrowly, arguing that the stop in
Terry was justified solely because the police officer also believed he was in
danger. Id. at 707. According to Justice Stewart's reading of Terry, therefore,
a stop solely to investigate crime, even with reasonable suspicion, would not be
allowed. See id. at 710.
95. See 442 U.S. at 216.
96. Id. at 219 (White, J. concurring) (citing, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
97. 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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test to a full-scale search.98 Upholding a principal's search of a
student's purse on less than probable cause, Justice White ar-
gued that the probable cause requirement was not indispensible
to a valid search. He asserted that the fourth amendment com-
mands that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although
both probable cause and the warrant requirement affect the
reasonableness of a search, under some circumstances neither
would be mandatory.9 9 The TL.O. majority thus viewed the
reasonableness balancing test as "the rule rather than the ex-
ception"'300 and as not restricted to searches or seizures involv-
ing only minimal intrusion.1 1
The Court's struggle over the susceptibility of full-scale
searches or seizures to balancing, illustrated by its conflicting
views in Dunaway and TL.O., is further complicated by the ad-
ministrative search cases like Camara. The housing inspections
condoned in Camara, if not full-scale searches, certainly consti-
tute far more than minimal intrusions. Some members of the
Court have argued that the balancing in Camara searches
should not extend to other intrusive searches because of the
Camara Court's recognition that the probable cause standard
governed, although it could be modified to account for the dis-
tinctive nature of administrative searches. 0 2 The difficulty
98. Id. at 337.
99. Id. at 341-43.
100. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (characterizing majority's use of
balancing test); see also Project. Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Proce-
dure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal, 74 GEo. L.J. 499,
514-15 (1986) (characterizing TL.O. as adopting an "across-the-board use of the
balancing test" for all cases). The plurality in Ortega v. O'Connor, 107 S. Ct.
1492 (1987), relied heavily on TL.O. in justifying its use of a reasonableness
balancing test in analyzing a full-scale search of an employee's office. Id. at
1495-98.
101. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38; see also Note, supra note 15, at 1133
(noting Court's abandonment of level-of-intrusiveness limit on use of balanc-
ing test in criminal investigations). The majority's position that the balancing
test governs fourth amendment analysis has not gone unchallenged. The
T.L.O. dissenters accused the majority of engaging in a "sizeable innovation in
Fourth Amendment analysis." Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dis-
senters stood by the position adopted in Dunaway that "all these cases al-
lowing seizures on less than probable cause involved 'seizures' so substantially
less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to
make Fourth Amendment 'seizures' reasonable could be replaced by a balanc-
ing test." Id. at 360.
102. For example, the dissenting justices in T.L.O., most of whom con-
curred in Camara, distinguished Camara in part because "[iun Camara, the
Court held that the probable-cause standard governed . . ., [a]lthough the
Camara Court recognized that probable-cause standards themselves may have
to be somewhat modified to take into account the special nature of administra-
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with this distinction is that the Camara-modified probable
cause inquiry is the same balancing test adopted in Terry and
used in TL.O.'0 3 Indeed, the Camara majority demonstrated its
balancing test by applying it to conventional criminal searches,
concluding that the resulting balance required a warrant based
on traditional probable cause.'0 4 The key point, of course, is
not that the balancing test required probable cause for a full-
scale criminal search, but that the Camara Court saw such
searches as theoretically subject to balancing. At a minimum
Camara presents significant difficulty for the argument that
the reasonableness balancing test applies solely to minimally
intrusive searches.
The Court's preoccupation with factors like administrative
searches and levels of intrusion demonstrates that the Court
has been unable to articulate a coherent and systematic view of
when the reasonableness balancing test applies in relation to
traditional probable cause. Camara and Terry planted the con-
ceptual seeds for the rule of reasonableness to control all
fourth amendment inquiries, yet the Court has continued to
vacillate over whether to disavow or embrace a broad role for
reasonableness. It has become evident that the Court should
stop addressing the relationship between the reasonableness
and warrant clauses in a piecemeal fashion and confront di-
rectly what their proper roles are in fourth amendment
analysis.
III. MEETING THE FIRST CHALLENGE OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION: A
COMPOSITE MODEL OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Defining the proper relationship between the reasonable-
ness and warrant clauses presents a formidable task. Deciding
when each clause should control is undeniably a decision about
the proper balance between the government's power of intru-
sion and the citizenry's privacy right. The model chosen also
tive searches." 469 U.S. at 360-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The dissent also argued that the administrative search cases involved a lesser
expectation of privacy in the areas inspected and were more minimal intru-
sions because the search's object was not criminal evidence. Id.
103. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text; cf. Note, supra note 15,
at 1133 (noting that although balancing test was originally linked to civil
searches, Court has extended it to criminal investigations).
104. See supra note 34.
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will have significant secondary ramifications, such as influenc-
ing the Court's willingness to extend the amendment's scope.
One commentator, despairing over the increasing complex-
ity of the fourth amendment's exceptions and categories, ar-
gued recently that the Court must either admit that the
warrant and probable cause requirements are applied inconsis-
tently and expressly adopt a comprehensive reasonableness
test, or apply the warrant and probable cause requirements
with full vigor and stop riddling them with exceptions.10 5 Ad-
vocating an either-or choice between the reasonableness and
warrant clauses is an understandable reaction to the frustration
of trying to reconcile the Court's fourth amendment cases.
Before such a choice is made, however, the Court must recog-
nize the consequences of allowing either clause to dominate.
Indeed, much of the Court's inconsistency can be understood as
a back-and-forth reaction to the problems raised when either
the warrant or reasonableness clause gains the upper hand.
A monolithic model would make the warrant clause the
complete focus of fourth amendment analysis. A government
search or seizure would always require probable cause, and
only exigent circumstances would excuse the absence of a war-
rant.10 6 The Supreme Court's case law prior to Camara and
Terry came fairly close to adopting such an absolute position.10 7
A monolithic reading of the amendment, however, is diffi-
cult to justify textually because it makes the amendment's "un-
reasonable search or seizure" language at best descriptive and
at worst redundant. 08 Moreover, exclusive emphasis on the
warrant clause would ultimately cause the Court to curtail the
fourth amendment's scope. If a warrant based on probable
cause was required every time the fourth amendment applied,
the Court would hesitate to bring government activities under
105. Bradley, supra note 2, at 1471-72.
106. See Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 393-94.
107. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
108. It now seems very unlikely that the debate over the proper relation-
ship between the reasonableness and warrant clauses will be resolved through
definitive historical evidence. One commentator has suggested that the draft-
ers of the fourth amendment had no concrete conception of when warrants
should or should not be issued but were willing to let such rules evolve. See
Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 410-12. See generally J. LANDYNSKI, supra note
84, at 42-45 (discussing scope and meaning of fourth amendment in historical
context); Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 258-59 (outlining historical framework
of the amendment). Such lack of original intent, however, should not preclude
the attempt to craft a view of the fourth amendment that accommodates both
government and privacy interests.
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the amendment out of concern for frustrating important gov-
ernment needs.
The Camara majority, for example, brought housing in-
spections from the periphery of the fourth amendment into its
full embrace only because traditional probable cause was not
required.10 9 Although the Camara dissent argued strenuously
that the majority's administrative warrant approach would
weaken overall fourth amendment protection, the dissent's so-
lution provided less fourth amendment protection, not more.1 10
Likewise in Terry the Court explained that one of its reasons
for eschewing a rigid probable cause and warrant requirement
in favor of a balancing test that considered the intrusion's scope
as a central factor was that a balancing test allowed the fourth
amendment to govern more police behavior.'1 1 In the long run,
therefore, insisting upon a warrant based on traditional prob-
able cause for every government search or seizure could result
in fewer fourth amendment protections because the scope of
government behavior governed by the amendment will be
narrower.
112
On the other hand, a sliding-scale model, placing complete
emphasis on the reasonableness clause such that a reasonable-
ness balancing test would apply to all searches and seizures,
also poses significant problems. The model presents textual dif-
ficulties by failing to provide an independent role for the
amendment's one concrete requirement of a warrant based on
probable cause. Under the sliding-scale model, the Court could
conclude that the fourth amendment never required a warrant
based on probable cause as a prerequisite to a reasonable search
or seizure.1 1 3 Although the Court would probably not adopt
109. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967).
110. Id. at 547-48 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent wanted to maintain
Frank's generalized due process approach. Id.; see supra notes 17, 32, 36.
111. The Court stated:
In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth
Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon per-
sonal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in
light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis
of reasonableness.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968).
112. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 393-95.
113. In contrast to the possibility of dispensing entirely with the warrant
and probable cause requirements under the sliding-scale model, Justice Frank-
furter explained that those requirements are, in fact, indispensable to fourth
amendment analysis:
One cannot wrench "unreasonable searches" from the text and con-
text and historic content of the Fourth Amendment. It was the an-
[Vol. 72:383
FOURTH AMENDMENT
such an extreme reading, the mere possibility illustrates how
the sliding-scale model fails to account for the warrant clause's
presence in the amendment's text.
Furthermore, the sliding-scale model breeds uncertainty
because it removes the warrant and probable cause require-
ments as the controlling fourth amendment values. As a result
the model allows the definition of reasonableness to drift with-
out any direction except for the Court's momentary perceptions
regarding the proper balance between governmental and indi-
vidual interests. The Court judges every government intrusion
on an ad hoc basis, balancing the competing interests involved.
Because of this process, the sliding-scale model ultimately
threatens privacy protections by taking away the amendment's
sole restraint on the Court's definition of reasonableness-a
warrant based on probable cause.11 4
Because both the monolithic and sliding-scale models have
inherent problems, 15 an approach is needed that enables the
clauses and their purposes to coexist in a manner that main-
tains the flexibility of the sliding-scale approach while retain-
ing the monolithic model's predictability and strength of
protections. This Article proposes that the Court adopt a com-
posite model of the fourth amendment under which the war-
rant and reasonableness clauses have independent purposes but
swer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without
warrants and searches with warrants unrestricted in scope. Both
were deemed "unreasonable." Words must be read with the gloss of
the experience of those who framed them .... When the Fourth
Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches" and then went on to
define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued
by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the
gloss of history that a search is "unreasonable" unless a warrant au-
thorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frandurter, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (not-
ing critical commentary of and Court's lessening reliance on Rabinowitz's gen-
eral reasonableness approach over the years).
114. As the Court observed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971): "In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear
of internal subversion, [the fourth amendment] and the values that it repre-
sents may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values were
those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts." Id. at 455.
See generally Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 390-95 (sliding-scale models lack
certainty required for principled rules of law).
115. As is evident, both models have flaws: the monolithic model's all-or-
nothing standard will result in the exclusion of certain government behavior
from the amendment's coverage, while the sliding-scale approach runs the risk
of degenerating into "one immense Rorschach blot." Amsterdam, supra note
5, at 393.
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work in tandem to achieve the fourth amendment's broader
purposes.116
A. THE COMPOSITE MODEL'S BASIC FRAMEWORK: INITIATORY
AND RESPONSIVE INTRUSIONS
Meeting the fourth amendment's first interpretational
challenge-delineating more precisely the relationship between
the two clauses-must start with identifying where the reason-
ableness inquiry leaves off and the warrant clause's probable
cause requirement begins. Currently, that intersection is a
mystical one based vaguely on government purkoses and levels
of intrusion.117 The proposed composite model suggests that
the Court should base the demarcation point on whether the
government is initiating the investigatory activity in the ab-
sence of any suspicious behavior, which the model calls an ini-
tiatory intrusion, or whether the government investigation is
based upon particularized suspicion, which the model terms a
responsive intrusion.
Basing fourth amendment analysis on the distinction be-
tween initiatory and responsive intrusions provides the warrant
and reasonableness clauses with clearly defined roles. Respon-
116. The Court has, in fact, attempted to reach such a compromise position:
The Government's argument to sustain the search here is simply
that it was reasonable under the circumstances. But it is by now axio-
matic that the Fourth Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable
searches and seizures" is to be read in conjunction with its command
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." Under our
cases, both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a
warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, though in certain lim-
ited circumstances neither is required.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 101 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (describing Court's "current accommodation" of tension between warrant
and reasonableness clauses). What is so striking and frustrating about the
Court's characterization is the lack of guidance it provides in determining how
the two clauses should be read in conjunction. See infra note 117 and accompa-
nying text.
117. The Court uses the warrant clause and flexible probable cause to as-
sess administrative and regulatory searches, but the boundary between the
realm of administrative searches and the world of traditional probable cause
and search warrants is hazy at best. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the Court has held that only certain governmental intrusions are
subject to a reasonableness balancing test under Terry, but it has not drawn a
clear line by applying the balancing test not only to limited and modest
searches, but to full-scale searches as well. See supra notes 90-104 and accom-
panying text. Even the relation of Camara, supposedly a warrant clause case,
to Terry, in theory a reasonableness clause case, remains cloudy, and they are
frequently cited in tandem as justification for balancing in any particular case.
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sive intrusions should be analyzed under the warrant clause.
The analysis thus would focus on probable cause, which tradi-
tionally has meant that a government intrusion is justified only
if the intrusion is in response to an individual's actions. 118 The
reasonableness clause in turn should be the fourth amendment
focus when the government is arguing that an initiatory intru-
sion is necessary because a responsive search would frustrate a
vital government interest. This approach limits the reasonable-
ness balancing test to the government's justification for dis-
pensing with individualized suspicion to conduct the intrusion.
The proposed composite model provides several immediate
advantages for fourth amendment analysis. Most fundamen-
tally, it simplifies and makes more logical the basic relationship
between the warrant and reasonableness clauses. It accom-
plishes this by focusing on the most distinctive difference be-
tween the two clauses-the probable cause requirement and its
emphasis on the responsive nature of the government's intru-
sions. Basing the analysis on the distinction between initiatory
and responsive intrusions avoids thorny problems like deciding
what constitutes an administrative search or a limited or major
intrusion. The distinction properly returns the fourth amend-
ment's analytical focus to the government's justification and
identifies a clear demarcation point between the two clauses.
The proposed composite model also restores the traditional
definition of probable cause and reestablishes its prominence as
a basic fourth amendment safeguard. Under the model, fourth
amendment analysis has two inquiries: whether there is a suffi-
cient governmental interest to justify an initiatory intrusion,"39
and, if there is not a sufficient government interest, whether
the police had probable cause. Rather than allowing the rea-
sonableness balancing test to control all fourth amendment
analysis, the model limits the test's use to a specific fourth
amendment inquiry-the propriety of an initiatory intrusion.
As a result probable cause is no longer merely a relevant factor
in determining reasonableness but again stands as an independ-
ent fourth amendment factor that defines when particular gov-
ernment intrusions are reasonable. Furthermore, because the
model deals with initiatory searches, such as housing inspec-
tions, under the reasonableness clause, it eliminates the need to
redefine or dilute probable cause. The model thus banishes
118. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
119. The appropriate standard for assessing the reasonableness of an initia-
tory intrusion is discussed infra Part IV.
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flexible probable cause from the warrant clause, restoring prob-
able cause's traditional meaning and thereby strengthening the
warrant clause's protections.
Additionally, the composite model is textually justifiable.
Unlike either the monolithic or sliding-scale models, the com-
posite model provides each clause an independent role in fourth
amendment analysis consistent with the amendment's lan-
guage. By restoring probable cause's traditional meaning, the
model allows probable cause to resume its historical role as the
definitive standard for a certain class of government intrusions,
those justified only when an individual's acts have given rise to
suspicion. At the same time, the model permits the reasonable-
ness clause to function in more than a subsidiary role qualify-
ing the warrant clause's requirements. The clause plays an
independent role in fourth amendment analysis, providing the
reasonableness standard by which initiatory intrusions are
judged.
Finally, while restoring probable cause's traditional mean-
ing and role, the composite model retains the flexibility to ac-
commodate situations in which a warrant based on traditional
probable cause would frustrate a vital government interest.
The model would bring needed government activities under the
fourth amendment. The model's approach in reaching that re-
sult, however, is the opposite of the Court's method in Camara
and Terry, in which the Court turned to flexible probable cause
and a reasonableness balancing test for its solution. Instead of
changing probable cause's meaning as in Camara, the model
gives the reasonableness clause the discrete role of governing
initiatory intrusions so that the amendment can accommodate
government activities outside the realm of full-scale criminal
investigations. At the same time, the model maintains an in-
dependent and strong presence for the warrant clause and its
protections. By realigning Terry and Camara under the war-
rant and reasonableness clauses, the composite model will undo
the cases' conceptual shortcomings while still achieving their
goal of giving the fourth amendment an expansive scope.
B. TERRY UNDER THE WARRANT CLAUSE: REASONABLE
SUSPICION BASED ON EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
The police stop and frisk at issue in Terry provides the
most obvious example of a situation in which a government's
interest would not justify an initiatory intrusion but a require-
ment of probable cause would frustrate an important govern-
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mental need: a frisk for weapons is normally not justified on a
random basis, but requiring probable cause exposes the police
to an unacceptable level of danger. To accommodate these pro-
cedures without undermining the structure of the fourth
amendment and its protections, the composite model would re-
verse Terry's analysis, which subjected the stop and frisk to a
reasonableness balancing test.
Instead of relying on the reasonableness clause, the com-
posite model would move the Terry stop and frisk conduct, as a
responsive search, back under the warrant clause. Conse-
quently, the analysis would focus on the warrant and probable
cause requirements. 20 In accord with the Court's traditional
fourth amendment case law,121 only exigent circumstances
would present an exception to the warrant clause require-
ments. In Terry the danger to the officer's safety would appear
to satisfy the exigent circumstances rationale and thus probable
cause would not be required. 22
Treating Terry stop and frisks as exigent circumstances
under the warrant clause, however, poses a new problem be-
cause the proposed exception now affects the probable cause re-
quirement rather than just the warrant requirement. 23 To
120. Another alternative, of course, also exists: Justice Douglas's rejection
in Terry of the standard of reasonable suspicion and retention of probable
cause as the only valid standard. $ee supra note 51 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
122. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1967).
123. Part of the Terry Court's rationale in eschewing the warrant clause
may have been because of the warrant clause's language, which states that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." See supra note 4. Because the
Court found probable cause inappropriate, it may have reasoned that the war-
rant clause could not apply, since by the clause's own terms no warrant can
issue "but upon probable cause." See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164,
3169-70 (1987) (judicial warrant cannot issue on less than probable cause). The
Camara Court, of course, avoided this conceptual problem by modifying the
definition of probable cause.
The Terry situation does present an added conceptual hurdle because the
exigent circumstances affect both the warrant and probable cause. The com-
posite model, however, views the essence of the warrant clause as probable
cause's responsive nature and its emphasis on a particular level of suspicion.
The model thus stresses the warrant clause as the starting point for analyzing
all responsive intrusions and accepts the difficulty that, in rare instances, both
the warrant and probable cause requirements may be modified.
Moreover, although the model modifies probable cause by allowing rea-
sonable suspicion in certain cases, the modification is different than that pres-
ent in the Camara decision. Whereas the Camara Court redefined probable
cause as a broad balancing test, the model does not take away probable cause's
essence, its responsive nature. Probable cause still serves, along with the war-
rant requirement, as the starting point for fourth amendment analysis. In this
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avoid coming full circle back to initiatory intrusions and the
reasonableness clause, the solution should preserve individual-
ized suspicion but modify the level of suspicion to accommodate
the exigency. The reasonable suspicion standard, with its objec-
tive nature and individualized focus, provides the logical alter-
native to probable cause when the facts necessitate an
exception.Y
If Terry was decided under the composite model, therefore,
the ultimate standard for a stop and frisk would be the same,
reasonable suspicion, except the reasoning would depend upon
a warrant clause-exigent circumstances analysis rather than a
reasonableness clause-balancing test analysis. 2 5 Although the
model ends up with the same standard the Court arrived at in
Terry, it yields several advantages worth the realignment of the
fourth amendment inquiries.
Most importantly, characterizing the Terry standard for a
stop and frisk as an exception under the warrant clause refur-
bishes probable cause's tarnished role in fourth amendment
analysis. Instead of operating as a general compromise stan-
dard as it did in Terry, reasonable suspicion now operates only
as a narrow exception to traditional probable cause. The analy-
sis begins with probable cause itself, and any lesser standard of
suspicion may be justified only as a limited exception based on
emergency considerations. Thus, the model restores probable
cause's primacy as the benchmark for individualized suspicion
within the fourth amendment. In contrast, the Terry Court's
reliance on a generalized weighing approach made probable
cause simply an end point on a continuum of reasonableness, an
analysis which ultimately allowed reasonable suspicion to be-
come an attractive compromise away from the rigors of prob-
able cause.126
sense the model's modification of probable cause to reasonable suspicion is
simply an extension of the long-accepted situation in which the warrant
clause's requirement of probable cause still controls even though a warrant
cannot issue because of exigent circumstances. See supra notes 9-14 and ac-
companying text; cf. Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3172 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(warrant requirement applies even if reasonable suspicion rather than prob-
able cause required); LaFave, supra note 41, at 54-56 (Terry stop and frisks an-
alyzed under warrant clause and flexible probable cause). The basic premise is
that it is better to have the principles of the warrant clause guide the analysis
for responsive intrusions rather than resort to a broad reasonableness inquiry.
124. Although reasonable suspicion has its own definitional problems,
supra note 65, it is the best alternative level of individualized suspicion to be
defined.
125. See supra note 123.
126. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
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The exceptions approach thus circumscribes the refuge of
reasonable suspicion. By requiring exigent circumstances, the
facts under which reasonable suspicion can supplant probable
cause are narrowly limited, preempting the easy, middle
ground of reasonable suspicion. Exigent circumstances would
most likely exist when the safety of the public or law enforce-
ment agents is endangered.2 7 A Terry stop and frisk, there-
fore, would still pass constitutional muster. Beyond police and
public safety, however, the likelihood that valid exigent circum-
stances exist would correspondingly diminish.128
127. The exigent circumstances rationale brings Terry's reasoning in line
with the narrow scope some initially argued for after Terry. Justice Stewart
in particular argued that Terry did not allow a stop without a reasonable belief
that the defendant was armed and dangerous. See Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 706 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Others saw Terry stops as limited
to situations in which violent crimes were suspected. See United States v.
Briguoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 888 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring); LaFave,
supra note 41, at 65-66 (discussing appropriate circumstances for Terry stops).
Because of Terry's broad reasonableness rationale, however, such limitations
eventually gave way.
As with any approach that does not always require a warrant based on
probable cause, the exigent circumstances test leaves open the potential for
evading the warrant clause's requirement. The exigent circumstances ration-
ale, however, tries to minimize the potential by narrowing the realm of justifi-
cations for making an exception and by placing the burden on the government
to justify departure from requiring a warrant based on probable cause. Cf.
People v. Ramey, 42 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637
(1976) (defining exigent circumstances as "an emergency situation requiring
swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property,
or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence").
128. The most troublesome cases are those in which the intrusion's target
arguably has a different expectation of privacy than the general public. For
example, the Court possibly should treat students, parolees, and law enforce-
ment officers differently under the warrant clause because of their different
expectations of privacy. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338-39
(1985) (student searches); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 252 (9th Cir.) (war-
rantless search of parolee's home), cert denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); Adrow v.
Johnson, 623 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (N.D. Il. 1985) (strip search by corrections
officer); cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in jail cell). Some of these cases could be resolved on an exi-
gent circumstances rationale, allowing a reasonable suspicion standard to
suffice. For instance, exigent circumstances probably would permit a search of
arrestees entering a prison although only reasonable suspicion exists that they
are smuggling weapons or drugs. The exigent circumstances focuses on the
danger posed to other inmates and guards. Cf. Smith v. Montgomery County,
643 F. Supp. 435, 438-39 (D. Md. 1986) (strip searches of detainees justified by
reasonable suspicion).
What about students at school or parolees, however, when exigent circum-
stances may not exist to justify a search, but arguably a lesser expectation of
privacy is involved? A loosening of standards poses the danger of the fourth
amendment degenerating into a vague balancing test. At the same time, the
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Similarly, the exceptions approach to probable cause re-
vives the fourth amendment's presumption against allowing
government intrusions and better protects the privacy interests
at stake. Probable cause would not depend upon factors such as
the degree of intrusion but would vary only upon a showing of
exigent circumstances. As a result the approach avoids the
temptation to lessen fourth amendment standards and dilute its
protections because an intrusion can be characterized as mini-
mal or minor. In the process, the approach also strengthens the
individual's right to be left alone because the threshold issue is
whether exigent circumstances exist.1 29 The degree of intru-
sion becomes relevant only in considering whether the means
used were reasonable.
Treating reasonable suspicion as a narrow exception recog-
nizes that the fourth amendment, through its probable cause
requirement, has already struck the basic compromise between
Court has increasingly recognized different levels of expectation of privacy
and extended fourth amendment protections accordingly. See generally infra
note 150 and accompanying text.
One potential solution is the adoption of the reasonable suspicion standard
when a special relationship between the individual and government exists jus-
tifying an exception. For instance, a parolee's relationship to the government
is so markedly distinct that the Court could identify and apply a lesser fourth
amendment standard. Latta, 521 F.2d at 250. Similar arguments might apply to
students in a public school setting or to military personnel. See, e.g., T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting "special characteristics" of ele-
mentary and secondary schools justifying different treatment). Simply driving
a car, with its diminished expectation of privacy, however, would not be suffi-
cient to lower the required level of suspicion for a search or seizure because
the individual does not acquire a special relationship with the government dis-
tinct from the general population simply by driving an automobile.
The special relationship test, of course, need not be adopted at all, and
persuasive arguments can be made that probable cause should apply with full
force to these situations. See id. at 357-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A special
relationship test, however, appears to be the best alternative given the other
option of leaving the warrant clause altogether and reverting to a general rea-
sonableness inquiry. At least with the special relationship test, the nature of
reasonable suspicion as an exception has been retained, as well as most of the
advantages of an exceptions approach over a general reasonableness view.
129. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. Elaborating on an indi-
vidual's right to be left alone, Justice Brennan has contended that
the Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance be-
tween the individual and society depends on the recognition of "the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men." That right protects the privacy and se-
curity of the individual unless the authorities can cross a specific
threshold of need, designated by the term "probable cause." ... [A]
"balancing test" can[not] replace the constitutional thr~shold [of prob-
able cause] with one that is more convenient for those enforcing the
laws but less protective of the citizens' liberty.
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individual privacy and the government's interest in enforcing
the law for the community's protection. 30 And to the extent
that certain intrusions are barred because probable cause and
not reasonable suspicion is required, such is the cost of the
fourth amendment: "[T]here is nothing new in the realization
that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a
few in order to protect the privacy of us all. 131
C. CAmAiA AS AN INITIATORY SEARCH: REINING IN THE
REASONABLENESS BALANCING TEST
Faced with a government intrusion that would be frus-
trated by requiring traditional probable cause, the Camara
Court took the warrant clause and redefined probable cause to
accommodate the unique nature of housing inspections. 32 The
proposed composite model, in contrast, would treat housing in-
spections as initiatory searches and would ask whether such
government intrusions, lacking individualized suspicion, are
valid under the amendment's reasonableness clause. This ap-
proach avoids any need to tamper with probable cause's tradi-
tional definition.
Freeing Camara from the artificial bindings of administra-
tive warrants and flexible probable cause allows a coherent
overall fourth amendment framework to emerge that explains
the relationship between the warrant and reasonableness
clauses.133 By exorcising flexible probable cause from the war-
rant clause, the model restrains the reasonableness balancing
TL.O., 469 U.S. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
130. The Court has recognized the proposition that the fourth amendment
has already struck the compromise between individual privacy and the govern-
ment's law enforcement interests. In Ybarra v. Illinois, the Court stated:
"The 'long-prevailing' constitutional standard of probable cause embodies 'the
best compromise that has been found for accommodating [the] often opposing
interests' in 'safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences
with privacy' and in 'seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community's protection."' 444 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1979) (quoting Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)). Under Terry, probable cause is a factor bearing
on reasonableness. The proposed composite model, on the other hand, views
the warrant and probable cause requirements as qualified by reasonableness
but as more than mere factors in determining reasonableness. See Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 341 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1987).
132. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
133. Justice Stevens in particular has argued that Camara has disturbed
the "express purpose of the Warrant Clause." Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S.
287, 302 n.5 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 512 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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test to a particular class of cases, initiatory intrusions. Unless
the Court determines that an initiatory intrusion is justified,
the role of the reasonableness balancing test ends, and the in-
quiry shifts to the warrant clause's probable cause requirement.
As a result probable cause no longer is subsumed under a broad
rule of reasonableness but coexists as an independent factor
within fourth amendment analysis. The model thus strikes a
balance between the need for traditional probable cause to
serve as a benchmark of fourth amendment protections and the
necessity of maintaining flexibility by providing reasonableness
with an independent role in fourth amendment analysis.
Removing initiatory searches from the warrant clause does
lead to the loss of one protection provided by Camara: adminis-
trative warrants are no longer a presumed starting point. The
Court's historical preference for a warrant led the Camara
Court to rely on the warrant clause and created the need to
modify probable cause's meaning.134 Although a reasonable-
ness clause analysis under the composite model does not pre-
clude requiring a warrant,135 the primary question is no longer
whether the means chosen for conducting the search or seizure
satisfy the warrant clause, but whether the means reasonably
effectuate the goals of the initiatory search.
The loss of warrant protection under the composite model
for initiatory searches is worth the price. The Camara Court
emphasized the procedural warrant requirement to such an ex-
tent that it altered probable cause's meaning in the process.
Procedural requisites for conducting an intrusion are undenia-
bly important; however, the Court's first concern should be
whether the government had sufficient justification for the in-
trusion. Requiring rigorous justification enhances the fourth
amendment's protection of the individual's right to be left
alone-" 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men' "' 6-- and thus should be the amend-
ment's priority. The Camara sacrifice of probable cause's re-
sponsive nature and its strong privacy protections to bring
134. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
135. A court, for example, could decide that the only valid way for an initi-
atory intrusion to proceed would be to obtain prior judicial approval. Unlike
under Camara, however, the relevancy of the warrant rests not on the war-
rant clause itself, but on an independent reasonableness analysis. See infra
note 192.
136. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 361-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
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housing inspections under the warrant clause improperly re-
versed the fourth amendment's priorities. The Court placed
procedural safeguards over the need to maintain a high thresh-
old for the government's justification.137
Moreover, dispensing with an administrative warrant in
favor of requiring sufficient government justification may, in
fact, provide more, not less, procedural protection. Justice Ste-
vens, an ardent critic of Camara, has observed that
an "administrative search warrant" does not satisfy the requirements
of the Warrant Clause. Nor does such a warrant make an otherwise
unreasonable search reasonable.
A warrant provides authority for an unannounced, immediate en-
try and search. No notice is given when an application for a warrant
is made and no notice precedes its execution; when issued, it autho-
rizes entry by force. In my view, when there is no probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed and when there is no special en-
forcement need to justify an unannounced entry, the Fourth Amend-
ment neither requires nor sanctions an abrupt and peremptory
confrontation between sovereign and citizen.
1 3 8
Justice Steven's observation that an administrative warrant
gives the government a power to intrude incommensurate with
its justification illustrates vividly how procedural concerns can
be elevated to such a degree that the reason for the intrusion is
lost in the process. Under the composite model, in contrast, the
threshold inquiry for initiatory intrusions focuses on the gov-
ernment's justification. The model then addresses procedural
concerns by looking at their relationship to the achievement of
the intrusion's goal.-3 9
137. See Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 64, at 632, 634 (court overemphasiz-
ing control of discretion in comparison to justification for search); Wasser-
strom, supra note 9, at 308-09 (same); cf. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 411
(recognizing difference between concerns over controlling discretion in con-
ducting search and requiring adequate justification to conduct search).
138. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 513-14 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(citation and footnotes omitted); see also id. at 513 n.2 ("[A] warrant is not sim-
ply a device providing procedural protections for the citizen; it also grants the
government increased authority to invade the citizen's privacy.").
139. The Court has concentrated heavily on the issue of controlling the
government's discretion in conducting the search. See, e.g., Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
559 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973). The
Court's overemphasis on the control of discretion, in comparison to scrutiniz-
ing the government's justification, occurs because the current approach makes
the amount of control over discretion and the level of intrusiveness part of the
reasonableness inquiry itself. Justice Brennan has observed how this effect
turns the amendment on its head:
The Court's view that "selective referrals-rather than questioning
the occupants of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amend-
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IV. THE SECOND CHALLENGE OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION: DEFINING
THE MEANING OF REASONABLENESS
The composite model provides a systematic approach to
fourth amendment analysis by establishing independent roles
for the warrant and reasonableness clauses. After the model
provides a distinct role for reasonableness, however, the second
basic challenge of constructing a fourth amendment analysis
arises: how to define reasonableness without undermining the
amendment's basic protections. Even when analytical re-
straints such as the initiatory-responsive intrusion dichotomy
limit reasonableness' role, a loose definition of reasonableness
could overshadow the warrant and probable cause require-
ments. The proposed model must avoid the danger of formulat-
ing a reasonableness standard that readily allows validation of
initiatory intrusions; it should require responsive intrusions as
the norm.
The difficulty in defining a reasonableness balancing test
derives from the term itself. The very notion of reasonableness
suggests a concept incapable of specific definition, a concept left
to case-by-case determination. The Court has justified the
vagueness of its current balancing test by relying on the
amendment's reasonableness language:
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the gen-
eral standard of "unreasonableness" as a guide in determining
whether searches and seizures meet the standard of that Amendment
in those cases where a warrant is not required. Very little that has
been said in our previous decisions and very little that we might say
here can usefully refine the language of the Amendment itself in or-
ment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring
public," stands the Fourth Amendment on its head. The starting
point of this view is the unannounced assumption that intrusions are
generally permissible; hence, any minimization of intrusions serves
Fourth Amendment interests. Under the Fourth Amendment, how-
ever, the status quo is nonintrusion, for as a general matter, it is un-
reasonable to subject the average citizen or his property to search or
seizure. Thus, minimization of intrusion only lessens the aggravation
to Fourth Amendment interests; it certainly does not further those
interests.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The composite model, in contrast, reaches the issue of how the intrusion is
carried out only once it is decided the intrusion is justified. The proposed
model's approach parallels the traditional probable cause approach in which
the discretion-controlling device, the warrant, is only issued after probable
cause, and therefore the government's justification, is found.
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der to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases such as this.140
As a result, the Court's analysis identifies the general factors
involved-the government's interest, the degree of intrusion,
and the level of privacy expectation-but then basically relies
on the majority's sense of reasonableness to yield an answer.141
The inquiry neither identifies a starting point-whether to as-
sume that government intrusions are, or are not, valid-nor
reveals how tightly the government measures must be drawn,
stating only that they must be reasonable.142
The Court's general invocation of the fourth amendment's
reasonableness language not only provides little meaningful
guidance, it begs the question of what reasonableness should
mean for the amendment's purposes. Balancing tests by their
nature require normative judgments, and despite efforts to give
140. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (citations omitted); see
also Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 283-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
141. See generally O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1499-1502 (1987)
(discussing reasonableness analysis for search of state governmental em-
ployee's private office without warrant). The Court has frequently excused its
imprecision by stating that "there is 'no ready test for determining reasonable-
ness."' New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117 (1986) (quoting Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967)) (holding officer's reach into vehicle to
uncover vehicle identification number not an unreasonable search).
Lest one think that the present reasonableness inquiry does not resemble
a "Rorschach-like 'balancing test,"' T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting), one need only read the Court's opinion in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309, 313-24 (1971). The majority opinion discusses at length, in list-like fashion,
a series of factors, id. at 318-24, in a manner which can justly be characterized
as stream-of-consciousness balancing. Despite only the most vague interrela-
tion of the eleven factors discussed, the Court concluded that if a warrantless
search had occurred, it was reasonable. Id. at 318. Similarly, the recent Class
opinion is dissatisfying because of its wide-ranging analysis of the factors to be
weighed. 475 U.S. at 108-12. As the dissent points out, the majority's factors
are important, but the majority never demonstrated how they applied to the
case. Id. at 126 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Note, supra note 15, at
1129-32 & nn.26-28 (discussing vagueness of Court's balancing approach).
142. Commenting on the vagueness of the Court's reasonableness balancing
test, Justice Frankfurter contended:
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some cri-
terion of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district
judges or the police to say that an "unreasonable search" is forbid-
den-that the search must be reasonable. What is the test of reason
which makes a search reasonable? The test is the reason underlying
and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and the expe-
rience which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the
evils to which it was a response.... It is for this Court to lay down
criteria that the district judges can apply. It is no criterion of reason
to say that the district court must find it reasonable.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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them a scientific or mathematical thrust, they will invariably
entail the weighing of individual judges' and Justices' values at
some point in the process.143 In some areas, however, the Court
has developed descriptive guidelines of how strong the govern-
ment interest must be and how narrowly drawn the means
must be to achieve the ends. For example, the fourteenth
amendment provides only that a state cannot "deny to any per-
son the equal protection of the laws," and yet the Court has not
simply relied on the individual judgements of the Justices as to
what is equal. Rather, it has devised specific standards to apply
in different contexts. 14 The Court has developed similar tests
for due process 145 and freedom of speech,146 terms that also are
not self-defining. Similar Court-developed standards are
needed for fourth amendment analysis.
A. THE NEED FOR A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT
LNTEREST-LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS TEST
As a starting point, a structured balancing test should rec-
ognize the special nature of the government's justification for
initiatory intrusions. With responsive intrusions the individ-
ual's suspicious conduct itself generates the government's justi-
fication for intruding. With initiatory intrusions, however, the
government generates its own justification independent of the
individual's actions, which may be entirely innocent. The dif-
ference between the source of the government's justification
for initiatory and responsive intrusions suggests that initiatory
intrusions pose unique dangers to the fourth amendment right
143. See generally Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution
Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 155-172 (1984) (criti-
cizing the technocratic vision of the Burger Court which budgets rights instead
of vindicating justice). Justice Brennan greeted the adoption of balancing tests
in TL.O. with opprobrium:
All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief nods by the Court
in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in
fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will. Perhaps this
doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely a convenient umbrella
under which a majority that cannot agree on a genuine rationale can
conceal its differences.
469 U.S. at 369-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. The Court has developed three tiers of scrutiny ranging from a strict
scrutiny test to a rational basis test, depending on whether a suspect class is
the target of the governmental classification. See generally J. NowAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW 528-33 (3d ed. 1986) (standards for
equal protection claims).
145. See generally id. at 350-60 (substantive due process tests).
146. See generally id. at 837-65 (balancing tests for free speech analysis).
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to be left alone.147 Because the initiatory intrusion's justifica-
tion does not depend on suspicious behavior, individuals can
avoid the intrusion only by foregoing innocent activities like
driving a car, owning a home, or holding government employ-
ment.1 48 In this sense initiatory intrusions take away the indi-
vidual's right to be left alone and turn it over to a court's
evaluation of the government's need to intrude.149
Consequently, a definition of what constitutes a reasonable
initiatory intrusion must take into account the special danger
such intrusions pose to individual privacy. The standard
adopted must address three primary considerations: the fourth
amendment's structure and objectives, the protections accorded
other fundamental rights, and the policy concerns adhering to
balancing tests generally. Taking these considerations into
account, the standard that emerges as the soundest alternative
to the Court's current vague balancing test is a single-tiered
strict scrutiny standard based on a compelling government
interest-least intrusive means test.
150
147. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. The problem is some-
times phrased in terms of "presuming the guilt" of the intrusion's target. See,
e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D.N.J. 1986) ("The
City of Plainfield essentially presumed the guilt of each person tested [for
drugs].").
148. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (up-
holding routine automobile checkpoints for illegal aliens); Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967) (requiring search warrants for housing
inspections).
149. With responsive intrusions, on the other hand, the individual can pre-
clude the government's power to intrude by avoiding suspicion-creating
behavior.
150. Under the proposed composite model, the reasonableness balancing
test governing initiatory intrusions also could be defined in terms of two-tiered
scrutiny, rather than solely in terms of strict scrutiny. The second tier could
embody the Court's intermediate scrutiny test which requires that the means
bear a substantial relationship to an important governmental interest. See,
e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 204 (1976) (using intermediate scrutiny
for gender classification); cf. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to state marijuana regulation). See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrUIoNAL LAW 1083 (1978) (discussing intermedi-
ate level). Which level of scrutiny applies would depend on how great an ex-
pectation of privacy applies to the situation, a distinction the Court has
increasingly recognized. For example, when the government activity impinges
upon the home, the Court has held that the fourth amendment's protections
are at their greatest. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 587, 589-90 (1980). In other situations, how-
ever, such as automobile searches, the Court has held that the defendant has a
diminished expectation of privacy, requiring readjustment of the fourth
amendment calculus. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) ("One has a lesser expec-
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1. Deriving the Meaning of Reasonableness From the Fourth
Amendment
The fourth amendment provides one example of what con-
stitutes a reasonable search or seizure-a warrant based on
probable cause. The warrant clause teaches that reasonable-
ness does not occupy a middle position between the government
and individual's interest but is oriented against allowing gov-
tation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one's residence or the repository of personal effects .... It
travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view."); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-42 (1973). The other ma-
jor area in which the Court has found a diminished expectation of privacy is
commercial enterprises. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. United States, 106 S. Ct.
1819, 1827 (1986); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981).
The difficulty with the Court's attempted fine-tuning of fourth amend-
ment protections to reflect the level of expectation of privacy involved is that
privacy expectation has become just another ill-defined factor in the Court's
fourth amendment reasonableness analysis. In Opperman, for example, the
Court upheld automobile inventory searches because of the lowered expecta-
tion of privacy due to the public nature of cars and automobile travel. 428 U.S.
at 367-68. Yet as the dissent stressed, the inventory search in question did not
involve items in public view or relating to the public nature of travel, but the
closed compartments of a locked car. Id. at 386-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
A similar failure to correlate the expectations of privacy analysis with the
actual facts of the case occurred in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
The Class majority relied on the lack of expectation of privacy in a car's Vehi-
cle Identification Number (VIN), which can be seen through the windshield.
Id. at 118-19. Even if the majority was correct about the lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the VIN, however, the actual search in question in-
volved an entry of the car, a situation in which an expectation of privacy, al-
beit a diminished one, does exist. Id. at 124 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
majority thus relied on an expectation of privacy unrelated to the actual area
searched.
Different expectations of privacy should guide the reasonableness inquiry,
rather than simply serve as another factor with an ill-defined role. Using the
two-tiered approach, the Court would subject intrusions involving areas with a
high expectation of privacy, such as entries of the home or searches of the per-
son, to the compelling government interest test. The Court would assess in-
trusions involving a diminished expectation of privacy, such as those involving
commercial premises, under the substantial government interest test. Rather
than simply adding a diminished expectation of privacy as a factor to consider
in determining the reasonableness of the search, the diminished expectation of
privacy actually helps structure the Court's fourth amendment analysis.
If a compelling government interest test is seen as too inflexible, there-
fore, a two-tiered approach based on expectations of privacy provides the best
alternative. Although the pristine quality of a one-standard test for reasona-
bleness is lost, the additional test still would provide more guidance to the
courts' inquiry and yield greater protection than the present free-for-all bal-
ancing test. In addition, the demarcation point between the reasonableness
and warrant clauses is maintained because the threshold question is still
whether an initiatory search is justified or whether a responsive search is the
only justifiable intrusion.
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ernment intrusions and toward protecting individual privacy.
The government's burden of having to prove probable cause to
obtain a warrant even when pursuing the extremely important
objective of crime detection evidences that orientation.1 51 Re-
quiring the government to stay its hand in criminal investiga-
tions until the individual's actions give rise to probable cause
sets a high benchmark by which to judge and compare the rea-
sonableness of any search or seizure. The warrant clause's high
standards for criminal investigations thus provide an appropri-
ate guide for interpreting the reasonableness clause.
Using the warrant clause's requirements for criminal inves-
tigations to advocate a compelling government interest test
under the reasonableness clause at first may seem counterintui-
tive.152 After all, many of the governmental activities to which
the test would apply-housing inspections for example1 -5 3-ap-
151. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
152. Members of the Court on occasion have spoken in terms of a "compel-
ling government interest" or the need to show "exceptional circumstances" as
part of the balancing formula. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492,
1506 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that "special needs" must be
shown before warrant requirement is abandoned); New Jersey v._T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing state's compelling in-
terest in assuring that schools meet educational obligations); id. at 351 (Black-
mun, J., concurring) (referring to "exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable cause requirement impractical"). The Court may be coalescing
around a special needs test. See Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154 (1987);
O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1502. But see Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1159 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("The test is whether these law enforcement interests are suffi-
ciently 'substantial,' not, as the Court would have it, whether 'operational ne-
cessities render [a standard less than probable cause] the only practicable
means of detecting certain types of crimes."' (citation omitted)).
If the Court adopts and strictly applies a standard that a warrant and
probable cause be abandoned "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable," O'Connor, 107 S. Ct.
at 1500 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring)),, the
Court's standard would begin to reflect the stringency of the proposed compel-
ling interest-least intrusive means test. Even if the Court formally embraces
such a standard for when the balancing is allowed, however, the balancing test
itself remains vague and unwieldy. See supra notes 140-42, and invfra notes
172-79 and accompanying text. The Court already has expressed disagreement
over how a special needs test should be applied. See O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at
1511 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. A housing inspection generally involves only those areas in which a
hazard may occur and also does not carry the stigma associated with a criminal
investigative intrusion. The government is not breaking down doors but often
is trying to help in a paternalistic manner. To extend one Justice's metaphor,
when the government conducts an administrative search, it often acts as a
friend and not an accuser: "The caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we
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pear relatively minor when compared to searches or seizures in
the criminal context.1 4 Such a high standard is not counterin-
tuitive, however, once it is recognized that the fourth amend-
ment's threshold concern is with the intrusion itself and not
with the intrusion's scope or the government's motivation. As
the Court has recognized: "It is not the breaking of... doors,
and the rummaging of... drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offence; but it is the invasion of [the individual's] indefea-
sible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property."' 55 From the citizen's perspective, an intrusion is oc-
curring even if the government's purpose is supposedly
benevolent.
Even once the analysis is properly focused on the intrusion
itself as the primary fourth amendment concern, it may seem
logical that the more benign the government's purpose, the
weaker the government's justification to intrude needs to be.
In fact, the opposite is true. The fourth amendment's strictness
in requiring a warrant based on probable cause when pursuing
the important task of criminal investigation argues for as high a
standard when the government is not uncovering criminal evi-
dence. When the government intrudes for a noncriminal or be-
nign purpose, its need to intrude is less urgent than when it
intrudes for criminal investigatory purposes. Consequently,
even when the government purports to assist the citizen, the in-
dividual's privacy interests should predominate, and the Court
should scrutinize the government's justification strictly.156
trust, is a friend to one in need." Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971)
(upholding visits to AFDC recipients).
154. The Court's ambivalence over fourth amendment protections in which
caretaking functions are involved also is evident in the automobile inventory
cases. In both Opperman and Cady, the majority opinions raised the possibil-
ity that the inspections of the cars were not even fourth amendment searches
because the government's objective was not to uncover criminal evidence. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.6; Cady, 413 U.S. at 442. Because the government's
actions in these contexts might be characterized as minor or benevolent, one
may hesitate to subject them to constitutional scrutiny at all.
155. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1961) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
156. The fact that an intrusion has a benign purpose or that its scope is mi-
nor should be secondary to the government's need to intrude. Moreover, cau-
tion is advised when the government uses labels such as benevolent or
nonpunitive. As Justice Brandeis warned, "[e]xperience should teach us to be
most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are be-
nign." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), cited in Wyman, 400 U.S. at 343. Administrative and regulatory
searches, although characterized as benignly motivated, in fact often involve
severe consequences if the search is refused or a violation is found. In al-
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The Court's treatment of the distinction between misde-
meanors and felonies for fourth amendment purposes provides
an appropriate analogy to support a strict standard for govern-
ment justification under the reasonableness clause. Intuitively,
one might say that the more serious the suspected offense, the
greater the protections that the fourth amendment should pro-
vide. Yet, the Court has held the opposite to be true. The po-
lice must get an arrest warrant for misdemeanors in cases when
they would not need one for a felony arrest. 57 The police also
can enter a home without a warrant based on exigent circum-
stances for a felony but generally cannot do so for a misde-
meanor.158 Upon reflection these holdings make sense because
they recognize that the more minor the suspected criminal of-
fense, the less urgent the government's need to intrude and the
greater the care that should be required before the police can
invade an individual's home or interfere with an individual's
liberty.
Similarly, when the government searches for noncriminal
purposes, the court should require at least as great a govern-
ment justification for the intrusion as that required when the
lowing home visitations by social workers, for example, the Wyman majority
relied in part on the premise that the social worker's visits were the acts of a
"friend" desiring to assist the individual. 400 U.S. at 323. Yet if the recipient
refused these visits by the "friend," the government cut off assistance, id. at
340 (Marshall, J., dissenting), a consequence which hardly can be called be-
nign. Moreover, because the job required the social worker also to look for vi-
olations of the law, the "friend" was in fact part sleuth. Id. at 339. As the
dissent observed, "[a] paternalistic notion that a complaining citizen's constitu-
tional rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow helping him is
alien to our Nation's philosophy." Id. at 343.
In the end, to make the fourth amendment's applicability turn on the be-
nevolence of the government's purpose or whether criminal sanctions are in-
volved would only encourage game playing in characterizing the intrusion. See
supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text; cf. infra note 178 (noting parallel
problem of what perspective to use in determining level of intrusiveness).
Thus, when the government lacks an urgent need to intrude, the individual's
privacy interest should predominate over the Court's concern for secondary
matters such as the scope of the intrusion.
157. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-24 (1976) (no arrest warrant
required for felony arrest in public area, although warrantless arrests for mis-
demeanors allowed only when offense committed in officer's presence).
158. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) ("[Ain important factor to
be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of
the underlying offense .... A home entry [absent exigent circumstances]
should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a
minor offense.., has been committed."). See aZso T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 378-79,
379 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (degree of government intrusion must be pro-
portional to severity of the suspected violation).
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government searches for criminal evidence. That justification,
of course, is probable cause. The proposed compelling govern-
ment interest-least intrusive means test best approximates the
probable cause requirement in terms of stringency when the
government argues that individualized suspicion would thwart
the objective of its search.
2. Treating the Fourth Amendment as a Fundamental Right
The Court has recognized that the fourth amendment's
protections are "basic to a free society" and "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty."15 9 It has granted the amendment pre-
ferred status160 within the Bill of Rights and stressed that the
rights of privacy and personal security "are to be regarded as of
the very essence of constitutional liberty; and... the guaranty
of them is as important and as imperative as are the guarantees
of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen."'1 61
Adopting a strict scrutiny standard would fully bestow pre-
ferred status upon the fourth amendment as a fundamental
right and in the process would yield a more structured reasona-
bleness inquiry.
The Court's recognition of the fourth amendment as a fun-
damental right supports according the amendment the same
protections provided other fundamental rights. Indeed, the
composite model draws the compelling government interest-
least intrusive means test from the Court's balancing tests
designed to protect other fundamental rights. 62 The Court re-
quires strict scrutiny for the constitutional right of privacy,16 3
for example, which rests on the premise that "a certain private
sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the
reach of government.' 16 4 Because of the fundamental nature of
the right to privacy, the Court has ruled that the state may not
159. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (applying the fourth amend-
ment to states because right is "fundamental").
160. L. TRIBE, supra note 150, at 565.
161. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) (quoting Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
162. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 144, at 367, 531, 541.
See generally Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 685-86 (1977); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
163. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), the Court stated that "only
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' ... are included in this guar-
antee of personal privacy." See also id. at 155; J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 144, at 418 & n.3.
164. Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn., 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2184
(1986).
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act unless it can show that it has "a compelling" need for gov-
ernment interference.165 Even when a compelling governmen-
tal interest exists, any government action may sweep no
further than necessary to achieve the government's legitimate
objective. 166 The right to privacy addresses the same concerns
as the fourth amendment; the amendment, in fact, constitutes
one of the components of the right of privacy. 167
If the broad privacy right is entitled to heightened protec-
tions, the fourth amendment has an even stronger claim for
such protections. The fourth amendment's privacy interest has
a much longer constitutional lineage,168 and its privacy protec-
tions are easily extracted from the amendment's language.169
165. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. t
166. Id. California has an express right to privacy in its constitution, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1, which is protected by a compelling government interest test.
See, e.g., Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d
937, 943-44, 719 P.2d 660, 663, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90, 93 (1986) (city must justify em-
ployee polygraph testing that infringed on privacy right with compelling pub-
lic interest); People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 511, 668 P.2d 738, 742, 194
Cal. Rptr. 431, 435-36 (1983) (requiring psychotherapist to testify in criminal
prosecution implicated defendant's privacy right, so compelling state interest
was required); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 131-34, 610
P.2d 436, 440-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543-45 (1980) (compelling interest test re-
quired to justify regulation restricting house residents to related people);
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 761, 533 P.2d 222, 224-25, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96-97
(1975) (compelling interest required for privacy right violation by undercover
police who compiled dossiers on professors and students at university).
167. In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized that the right to privacy had
fourth amendment roots:
Mhe Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guar-
antee of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under the Consti-
tution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have,
indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment;
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights; in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of liberty guaran-
teed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152 (some citations omitted); see also Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 144, at 737-38.
168. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 144, at 734-35
('"The oldest constitutional right to privacy is that protected by the fourth
amendment's restriction on governmental searches and seizures.").
169. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) ("'The right of the people to be secure in their.., houses,' expressly
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, is perhaps the most 'textual' of the
various constitutional provisions that inform our understanding of the right to
privacy .... "). The Court in the early case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), invoked natural law concepts in discussing the basis of the fourth
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The generalized privacy right, in contrast, is of relatively recent
vintage and is drawn from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights,
of which the fourth amendment itself constitutes a key part.170
Most importantly, the privacy interests at stake with initiatory
intrusions under the fourth amendment are of yqual magnitude
and thus deserve similar protection.171
and fifth amendments: "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummag-
ing of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the in-
vasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property." Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
Justice Brandeis, in particular, "advocate[d] a wide reading of the fourth
amendment in order to insure that government did not intrude into the pri-
vacy of the individual." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 144, at
684. According to Justice Brandeis, the makers of the Constitution
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Gov-
ernment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (amendment's
"basic purpose ... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals");
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (fourth amendment creates a "right to
privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly re-
served to the people").
170. The first case, decided in 1925, involved the right to make decisions
concerning child rearing and education. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 521-26 (1925) (holding compulsory public school attendance violates
fourteenth amendment). Modern privacy analysis was not used, however, un-
til the landmark 1973 case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 118-32. The fourth
amendment privacy interest, in contrast, was officially recognized by the Court
in 1886. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (finding compulsory production of papers
within the spirit of the fourth and fourteenth amendments). The generalized
constitutional right to privacy has met a fair amount of resistance lately. See,
e.g., Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 (refusing to extend privacy right to homosexual
sodomy). See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 931-32 (1973) (arguing that constitutional right to pri-
vacy has nothing to do with right to abortion).
171. The argument that the fourth amendment privacy right should be ac-
corded the same level of protection given to the general right to privacy is not
intended to transform the amendment itself into a general privacy right.
Although the model would clarify and strictly define the fourth amendment's
method of analysis, the amendment's scope would remain the same. Conse-
quently, the proposed composite model cannot be criticized in the same sense
as Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding some electronic surveil-
lance without warrant constitutes search and seizure). In Katz the Court first
held that the fourth amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy.
Id. at 354-55. Katz's extension of coverage caused Justice Black to contend
that the Court had "made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all
laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court's broadest concept of
privacy." Id. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting). The proposed model, in contrast,
would not affect the fourth amendment's scope because it would not even ap-
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3. Balancing Tests and the Fourth Amendment
The nature of the interests balanced in the fourth amend-
ment context heightens the need for a rigorous standard for
testing the reasonableness of initiatory searches. The Court's
current balancing test appears to fairly accommodate the com-
peting interests: "On one side of the balance are arrayed the
individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal se-
curity; on the other, the government's need for effective meth-
ods to deal with breaches of public order."172 The difference in
the nature of the individual and government interests, how-
ever, makes the balancing test naturally favor the government's
interest over the individual's privacy interest. The governmen-
tal interests-saving lives, catching illegal aliens, stopping the
flow of illegal narcotics-are tangible and visible benefits that
will stand out in the balancing process. The privacy interests,
on the other hand, are much less tangible and pale in compari-
son. After all, what price is a small intrusion on one's time and
space given the enormity of the government's interests? 173
One flaw in the current balancing test that leads to a skew-
ing of interests in favor of the government is the test's failure
to consider that the intrusion in question will not be an isolated
intrusion. Ours is a society in which the government, especially
as technology advances, has increasingly intruded upon its citi-
zens' lives to achieve goals deemed desirable. 74 As a result an
intrusion cannot be considered in a vacuum; the balancing test
should account for the intrusion's cumulative effect on the in-
dividual's right to be left alone.175 The Court's present balanc-
ply until the Court determined that a reasonable expectation of privacy
existed.
172. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
173. See Tribe, supra note 143, at 157-59, 161 (noting costs always appear
weightier than intangible benefits in a cost-benefit calculus); see also T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Moved by whatever momentary evil
has aroused their fears, officials-perhaps even supported by a majority of citi-
zens-may be tempted to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each cit-
izen to assuage the perceived evil."); Greenberg, The Balance of Interests
Theory and the Fourth Amendment- A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court
Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1012-14 (1973) (com-
menting on difficulty of balance); Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 64, at 625-27
& n.136 (outlining flaws in Court's fourth amendment balancing test); Tribe,
Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1329 (1971) (noting difficulty of valuing intangible benefits).
174. Indeed, it was the increase in government regulation and inspection
that in part led the Camara Court to reexamine its holding in Frank. See
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967).
175. Justice Douglas eloquently noted the danger:
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ing test makes no such effort to accommodate a holistic view of
the government's proposed action, which is one of the "sins" of
balancing tests generally:
That leads to [another] sin that ... the current Court is committing-
profoundly, frequently, and with devastating effect: the sin of over-
looking the constitutive dimension of government action, including ju-
dicial action. That is, the Court is thinking of the actions challenged
before it purely in terms of the effects they will have out there in the
world in demonstrable ways, and not in terms of what they say about
who and what we are as a people and how they help to constitute us
as a nation.1
76
Until the Court modifies its present balancing test to accommo-
date the "constitutive dimension" of its holdings, the number
and types of government actions deemed reasonable will esca-
late and overwhelm the privacy interests at stake.
The potential for the cumulative effect of the Court's deci-
sions to engulf the privacy interest is compounded by another
"sin" of balancing tests-"the tyranny of small decisions":
There is [another sin] I would call ... inviting "the tyranny of small
decisions," a lovely phrase coined some time ago by the economist Al-
fred Kahn. He used the phrase to describe the fallacies of those econ-
omists and managers who tend to look down at their feet to figure out
how far they've gone and where they're heading. It's not a very illu-
minating view. They may think they've taken but a short step from
where they were just a moment ago; it's no surprise that, by the time
they realize it, they've departed a remarkable distance from their first
premises.1
77
Given the Court's tendency to gauge reasonableness by its pre-
vious decisions, this danger of progressive movement away
from original premises is especially great in the fourth amend-
ment area. For example, without the benefit of precedent, a
court may react to customs officials boarding a pleasure boat on
The bureaucracy of modern government is not only slow, lumbering,
and oppressive; it is omnipresent. It touches everyone's life at numer-
ous points. It pries more and more into private affairs, breaking down
the barriers that individuals erect to give them some insulation from
the intrigues and harassments of modern life. Isolation is not a consti-
tutional guarantee; but the sanctity of the sanctuary of the home is
such-as marked and defined by the Fourth Amendment ....
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
176. Tribe, supra note 143, at 165. Moreover, what may be lost in the bal-
ance, overwhelmed by the perceived present needs, are the very values that
gave rise to the amendment: "In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or
racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that
it represents may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values
were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts." Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
177. Tribe, supra note 143, at 162 (footnote omitted).
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the open seas without any suspicion of wrongdoing as overly in-
trusive. Given the benefit of precedent's approval of increas-
ingly more intrusive searches, however, a court could easily
conclude that the intrusion is reasonable because "while not
minimal, [it] is limited.' 7 8 The next case in turn will have the
suspicionless boarding of boats to rely on in gauging whether an
intrusion is reasonable.
A compelling government interest-least intrusive means
test would help alleviate the dangers of the present reasonable-
ness balancing test. It adds symbolically to the individual's side
of the balancing scales by declaring the privacy interest funda-
mental and emphasizing the magnitude of the government in-
178. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983). Trying
to determine the level of intrusion is itself a suspect exercise. Perhaps the
most illustrative example is the secondary referral at issue in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Martinez-Fuerte all cars passed
through a roadblock to check for illegal aliens. In a relatively small number of
cases there was a further diversion of motorists over to a secondary inspection
area; neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause was required for diver-
sion, with some evidence that the authorities made referrals largely on the ba-
sis of Mexican ancestry. Id. at 560.
The majority rejected the argument that the secondary referrals were too
intrusive to allow without individualized suspicion, concluding that "[t]he ob-
jective intrusion of the stop and inquiry... remains minimal. Selective refer-
ral may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that the stops should not
be frightening or offensive because of their public and relatively routine na-
ture." Id. Indeed, the Court suggested that the selective referrals actually en-
hanced fourth amendment interests to the extent that they "minimiz[ed] the
intrusion on the general motoring public." Id.
The majority's conclusion that the secondary referral did not involve
greater intrusiveness, even if based largely on apparent Mexican ancestry,
demonstrates a one-dimensional view of intrusiveness. The majority's conclu-
sion is not only susceptible to challenge on the grounds that being singled out
is genuinely frightening and upsetting, id. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
but also ignores the offensiveness and indignation of being singled out and de-
tained on the basis of ethnic origin when one's acts are innocent. Id. at 573.
Thus, the individual may not be frightened but still feel subjectively intruded
upon because of the very fact that his conduct is innocent and yet he is being
detained and questioned. Id. at 571 ("[C]heckpoints ... detain thousands of
motorists, a dragnet-like procedure offensive to the sensibilities of free citi-
zens.").
The Court's inability to agree on the level of intrusiveness involved in a
case is also evident in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). The majority
and dissent arrived at markedly different conclusions over the degree of intru-
siveness, mainly because they used different reference points. The majority
found that an officer's entry to examine the Vehicle Identification Number on
the dashboard was a minimal intrusion compared to a full-scale search. See id.
at 118-19. The dissent, on the other hand, compared the officer's actual entry
into the car with the intrusiveness of an "ordinary traffic stop" and found the
officer's actions far from minimally intrusive. Id. at 129 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
198
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
terest necessary before an intrusion is justified. Additionally,
the strict scrutiny standard avoids the possibility of government
intrusions slipping by based on a characterization of the govern-
ment's purpose as benign or of the intrusion's scope as mi-
nor.179  Instead, the compelling government interest-least
intrusive means test establishes a high standard across the
board for all intrusions and in the process recognizes that all in-
trusions implicate the citizenry's privacy interest.
B. IMPLEMENTING THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENT
INTEREST-LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS TEST
The compelling government interest-least intrusive means
test would narrow the realm of initiatory intrusions primarily
to situations in which the government can demonstrate that
lack of immediate action endangers the public's safety. An em-
phasis on safety restricts initiatory intrusions to those with suf-
ficient import to justify intrusions on the individual's privacy
interest: when the need to act immediately without particular-
ized suspicion is great because the dangers of waiting for suspi-
cion to form are so grave. Moreover, safety dangers are more
tangible and less susceptible to manipulation than other broad
governmental interests. 80 In contrast, initiatory intrusions
that are simply more efficacious in achieving an important gov-
ernmental purpose will not satisfy the compelling government
interest-least intrusive means test. As a result the test returns
the fourth amendment's orientation to responsive intrusions
and probable cause as the norm.
An examination of the Court's decision in United States v.
Villamonte-Marquezl'8  demonstrates the shift in orientation
that the adoption of the compelling government interest-least
179. See supra notes 156, 178.
180. See, e.g., City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324-26 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (justifying police drug testing program in part because of
need to maintain "credibility and public confidence"); see also Note, supra note
15, at 1145 (advocating limiting balancing test primarily to situations that pose
immediate physical danger). Although few would contest the importance of
public confidence in the police, this type of government objective clearly can
be achieved by less intrusive means, and no immediate danger is posed or is
inevitable if the initiatory intrusion is not undertaken. Indeed, the rationale
easily applies to most government employees, even law professors at state in-
stitutions. Note that it is a different matter when the government interest al-
leged is that the government employee, if on drugs, poses an immediate danger
to the public. See Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1324, 1326. Law professors, at least,
would then be exempt.
181. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
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intrusive means test would cause in the Court's current reason-
ableness test. In Villamonte-Marquez the Court addressed ran-
dom boarding of vessels by customs officials to examine various
documents. The majority developed a grocery list of govern-
ment interests allegedly furthered by the document laws, in-
cluding the regulation of various trades, the collection of duties
and customs, and the regulation of imports and exports.18 2 The
document laws, for example, assisted the government "in the
prevention of entry into this country of controlled substances,
illegal aliens, prohibited medicines, adulterated foods, danger-
ous chemicals, prohibited agricultural products, diseased or pro-
hibited animals, and illegal weapons and explosives. ' '1 3 The
majority, focusing on the government's interests and the intru-
sion's scope, concluded that given the important governmental
objectives and the limited intrusion of boarding the vessel, the
search and seizure was reasonable.'8
Under the compelling government interest-least intrusive
means test, the Villamonte-Marquez search would fail. Under
that test, the analysis would have focused on whether effective
means short of an initiatory intrusion existed to prevent
threatened immediate harm.18 5 Because the government could
182. Id. at 591. The Court explained the government interests served by
the document laws:
These documentation laws serve the public interest in many obvi-
ous ways and respondents do not suggest that the public interest is
less than substantially furthered by enforcement of these laws. They
are the linchpin for regulation of participation in certain trades, such
as fishing, salvaging, towing, and dredging, as well as areas in which
trade is sanctioned, and for enforcement of various environmental
laws. The documentation laws play a vital role in the collection of
Customs duties and tonnage duties. They allow for regulation of im-
ports and exports ....
Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 592.
185. To this extent the test would resemble that used when the govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in curtailing speech but must use the least in-
trusive means available. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note
144, at 873. The use of the qualifier "effective" is not meant to open up a
whole new panorama of debate but rather simply to convey the notion that
any alternatives used to show that the initiatory intrusion is not the least in-
trusive means must be feasible. Such a qualifier would allay fears that "[t]he
logic of... elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuper-
able barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers."
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 n.12 (1976).
Before ultimately settling on a "reasonable means" analysis, the Court ac-
tually flirted with adopting a least intrusive means requirement for the fourth
amendment. Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (least
restrictive means) with United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985)
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have guarded against the overwhelming list of evils prevented
by strict enforcement of the document laws without resorting
to initiatory searches to examine the ship's documents,1 86 im-
mediate random investigation was not warranted. Random
stops and searches may provide better detection, but that will
be true in almost any situation. Any extra difficulty caused by
prohibiting an initiatory intrusion is simply the fourth amend-
ment's cost of protecting against unnecessary intrusions; law
enforcement interests should intrude on privacy interests only
to the minimal extent necessary. L8 7
The compelling government interest-least intrusive means
test best maintains the norm of nonintrusion and protects the
privacy interest when initiatory searches are involved.
Although the strict scrutiny standard has acted as a virtual
death blow in certain areas, such as equal protection, 88 such a
stringent standard would not eliminate initiatory searches
under the fourth amendment. Whereas it is very difficult to
imagine a legitimate race-based classification,18 9 situations do
arise when a compelling need justifies an initiatory search.
Although certain initiatory searches presently approved would
(only reasonable means required) and Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 591 n.5
(same). See generally Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 64, at 628 n.143 (discuss-
ing Court's use of least intrusive means test). In any case the availability of
alternatives remains central, although not determinative, to the Court's analy-
sis when reviewing government procedures. For example, in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the majority rejected random stops of cars in part
because less intrusive alternatives, "both those in use and those that might be
adopted," were available. Id. at 659; see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,
118 (1986); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 873 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higgin-
botham, J., concurring) (suggesting availability of less restrictive alternatives
directly relevant to whether administrative warrants should issue).
186. The Villamonte-Marquez dissent, for instance, pointed to the availabil-
ity of uniform identification procedures and use of ship-to-shore radio for
tracking documentation and registration procedures. 462 U.S. at 609 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Brennan proceeded to argue that, given the less intru-
sive alternative, "[ilt is unseemly at best for the Government to refrain from
implementing a simple, effective, and unintrusive law enforcement device, and
then to argue to this Court that the absence of such a device justifies an un-
precedented invasion of constitutionally guaranteed liberties." Id.
187. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he Amendment plainly operates to disable the government from
gathering information and securing evidence in certain ways.... Understood
in this way, the Amendment directly contemplates that some reliable and in-
criminating evidence will be lost to the government.").
188. L. TRIBE, supra note 150, at 1000.
189. But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294-99
(1978) (addressing "benign" classifications based on race).
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fail under a higher standard, other government intrusions
would receive continued approval.
For example, the initiatory intrusions involved in Camara
would satisfy the compelling governmental interest-least intru-
sive means test. In contrast to Villamonte-Marquez, the Court
in Camara properly focused on whether less intrusive means
short of a suspicionless inspection could achieve the govern-
ment's objectives regarding housing inspections. The Camara
Court, albeit through a flexible probable cause analysis,
stressed the special need for random initiatory searches as part
of a housing inspection scheme. Emphasizing that the abate-
ment of dangerous conditions protected public safety, the Court
argued that limiting the government's generalized power of in-
spection would gravely impede its ability to guard against
health and safety dangers.190 The Court therefore focused on
the need for preventive measures as the only means available
to avert immediate dangers to the public.
Similarly, the compelling government interest-least intru-
sive means test would likely justify the weapon detection proce-
dures used before boarding airplanes. Given the uniqueness of
an airplane and its isolation from law enforcement agents once
in the air, screening passengers for weapons prior to boarding is
arguably the only effective detection procedure available. Prior
to boarding, the opportunity to observe passengers to form sus-
picion regarding whether an individual is armed is extremely
limited.19' Thus, in both the housing and airplane boarding
contexts, the government's need to protect the public's safety is
190. Exploring the government's need to conduct initiatory searches in the
housing context, the Court contended:
The public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be pre-
vented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing tech-
nique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions-faulty
wiring is an obvious example-are not observable from outside the
building and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant
himself....
"Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to
inspect dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area
search or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable im-
portance to the maintenance of community health; a power that
would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safe-
guards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need
for preventive action is great, and city after city has seen this need
and granted the power of inspection to its health officials .... "
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (quoting Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959)).
191. See generally United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (ad-
dressing reasonableness of airport screening procedures).
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simply so great that, despite the fundamental privacy interests
at stake, waiting until the circumstances would justify a respon-
sive intrusion is too dangerous. 192
C. THE BOTTOM LINE ON REASONABLENESS AND THE STRICT
SCRUTINY STANDARD
In the end no bright line or per se rule emerges for analyz-
ing initiatory searches. The proposed strict scrutiny standard
basically is a refinement of the Court's present reasonableness
test of weighing the government's interest against the intrusion
on the individual's privacy interest. Reasonableness still hinges
on a balancing test conducted by a court.
In contrast to the Court's present analysis, however, the
compelling government interest standard unambiguously re-
orients fourth amendment analysis toward protection of the in-
dividual's privacy interest. The test also guards against the
cumulative erosion of privacy bk "minor" intrusions, a danger
for which the present general weighing process does not ac-
count. Moreover, although not a per se rule, the reasonable-
ness inquiry is more precisely guided and makes agreement on
an intrusion's validity easier. All things considered, it should
be easier for the Court to attain a consensus when the question
is whether the government has shown a compelling govern-
ment interest, rather than when the question is whether the
192. Once the government demonstrates that the circumstances justify an
initiatory intrusion under the compelling government interest-least intrusive
means test, the actual means used to conduct the intrusion must also intrude
on the privacy interest as minimally as possible. For example, a weapon-
screening process may be a valid initiatory intrusion, supra note 191, but it still
must be carried out in the least intrusive manner that is feasible. Because a
metal detector could be used to screen all passengers, a frisk would be unrea-
sonable by comparison. Cf. Wilkinson v. Foust, 639 F. Supp. 518, 531 (D. Conn.
1986) (finding mass searches at Ku Klux Klan meetings unnecessarily intru-
sive).
The least intrusive means test also would require the Court to ensure that
the government means do in fact further the government interest. The
Court's present scrutiny of how tightly the means serve the ends is often lax.
In New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), for example, Justice Brennan
commented:
I find the Court's holding particularly disturbing because none of the
factors the Court relies upon-the lack of reasonable expectation of
privacy in the [vehicle identification number], the officers' observing
respondent commit minor traffic violations, the government's interest
both in promoting highway safety and in shielding officers from dan-
ger, and the allegedly limited nature of the search that took place-
gave the police any reason to search for the VIN.
Id. at 130 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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government's intrusion is reasonable.193
Finally, the strict scrutiny standard brings the definition of
reasonableness in line with the level of protection illustrated by
the warrant clause. Unless an initiatory intrusion can satisfy a
standard comparable in justification to probable cause-the
compelling government interest-least intrusive means test-the
Court will find the intrusion unreasonable. By using probable
cause to define the reasonableness standard, the proposed ap-
proach brings the analysis full circle from Camara. Camara
used the reasonableness balancing test to define probable cause,
which weakened probable cause's role. The proposed approach,
in contrast, uses probable cause as an illustration of reasonable-
ness, strengthening individual privacy rights. The reversal in
definitional techniques encourages an expansive view of the
fourth amendment's domain while jealously guarding the pri-
vacy rights under its protection.
CONCLUSION
The Court's fourth amendment caselaw is marked by a
continuing struggle to craft a coherent relationship between the
broad command against "unreasonable searches and seizures"
and the specific rule that "no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause." The Court's effort to introduce a reasonable-
ness balancing test in the Camara and Terry cases has proved
unworkable. The cases expanded the fourth amendment's
scope, but in the process they traded away an independent role
for probable cause in favor of an ill-defined balancing test. As a
result the first challenge of fourth amendment interpretation-
defining a logical relationship between the reasonableness and
warrant clauses-has gone unmet.
The proposed composite model meets that challenge by re-
aligning the Camara and Terry holdings under the reasonable-
ness and warrant clauses. The realignment allows an orderly
and sensible relationship to emerge between the two clauses
without having to change probable cause's meaning, define an
193. The consensus might not reflect the individual judge's or Justice's
view of what is reasonable but might be reached only as the basis of whether
the legal standard of a compelling government interest had been met. This re-
sult may in fact be a positive sign of the achievement of one of the model's
purposes: the forging of a sufficiently structured fourth amendment analysis
so that an intrusion's validity no longer depends upon an individual jurist's
view of what is reasonable but reflects broader values that are consistently ap-
plied. See generally Note, supra note 15, at 1144-45 (arguing more precise
methodological approach needed for fourth amendment balancing).
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administrative search, or determine whether an intrusion is mi-.
nor, modest, or major. Instead, whether the reasonableness or
warrant clause applies depends upon whether the intrusion is
an initiatory or responsive intrusion. By making the responsive
characteristic of probable cause the fulcrum between the two
clauses, the composite model reestablishes the prominent role
of probable cause within the fourth amendment.
Because the proposed composite model introduces an in-
dependent role for the reasonableness clause, the second chal-
lenge of fourth amendment interpretation arises-how to
define reasonableness. The model requires that the govern-
ment prove a compelling government interest and demonstrate
that an initiatory intrusion is the least intrusive means reason-
ably available. Although a high standard, it reflects the treat-
ment that the Court gives to other fundamental rights, such as
the constitutional right to privacy, of which the fourth amend-
ment is a part. Moreover, the standard is comparable in strict-
ness to the warrant clause's probable cause requirement, which
reflects the degree of fourth amendment protections intended
for privacy rights. Finally, the standard implements the norm
of nonintrusion founded in the fourth amendment and illus-
trated by the probable cause requirement. Absent compelling
government justification, individuals have the right to be left
alone, especially in a society in which an increasing array of mi-
nor intrusions can cumulatively erode the individual's sphere of
privacy.
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